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Daniel, Dating of. The book of Daniel contains an incredible amount of detailed predictive prophecy. It claims to speak of many of the great kingdoms in the course of human history well in advance of their times: Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, and Rome. If true, it is one of the great evidences of the divine origin of the Bible, and by comparison, of other books of the Bible (*see* PROPHECY, AS PROOF OF THE BIBLE).

History or Predictive Prophecy? Daniel looked ahead in time to the kingdoms of the Gentiles from the reign of Nebuchadnezzar, starting about 605 B.C. , down to the Roman Empire, which began to exercise dominance as early as 241 B.C. and, under the Roman general Pompey, took over Palestine in 63 B.C. . So the book of Daniel describes world events hundreds of years into the future (Dan. 2:7). Daniel 11 presents a sweeping display of detail from the reign of Cyrus the Great to the reign of antichrist, the millennial kingdom, and the end of the age.

If Daniel wrote in the sixth century B.C. , as conservative scholars have maintained, then it is a powerful example of predictive prophecy. However, if Daniel is dated around 170 B.C. , as many critical scholars argue, he is writing history and not prophecy. One of the great arguments for the supernatural origin of biblical prophecy is then lost.

Internal Evidence Supports an Early Writing. There is persuasive evidence that Daniel lived and wrote in the sixth century B.C. and that, therefore, his detailed descriptions of history were supernatural predictions.

These events are presented as future. Their writing is dated by specific years of the reigns of kings of Babylon and Media-Persia (for example, the opening verses of chapters 2 , 7 , 9 , 10 , and 11). They were things that the wisest men in the greatest kingdom on earth could not divine (cf. Dan. 2:1–13). The text states explicitly that they were about the future, “what will be in the later days” (Dan. 2:28 ; cf. 9:24–29). It even declares that “the appointed time was long” in Daniel 10:1 , indicating the distant future. Hence, an attack on the predictive nature of Daniel’s words is an attack on his character. Yet only Joseph among Old Testament figures shows the impeccable character of Daniel (cf. Dan. 1:4 , 8 ; 6:3). Even his enemies recognized that they could not find fault in his character or dedication (Dan. 6:5).

The historical parts of Daniel are such clear, detailed, and accurate descriptions of his times as to lend credibility to his discourse when they speak about the future. Daniel’s clear distinction

of the present from the future alone is evidence that he was consciously writing prophecy, not history, in his great visions.

Before the rise of modern antisupernaturalism, the sixth-century date for Daniel (and, hence, its predictive nature) was not questioned among biblical scholars. Interestingly, it was not discovery of some archaeological or historical fact that led modern scholars after Benedict Spinoza to attribute a second-century date to Daniel. Rather, the (unproved) philosophical presupposition of antisupernaturalism led them to assume a late date (*see* MIRACLE ; MIRACLES, ALLEGED IMPOSSIBILITY OF).

That Daniel’s prophecies were postdated in historical accounts shows his accuracy. Otherwise, why all the effort on the part of those who reject the supernatural origin of his prophecies to date them after the time in which events actually occurred?

Witnesses Support an Early Writing. Josephus (*see* FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS), a Jewish historian from the time of Christ, listed Daniel among *the Prophets* (the second section of the Jewish Old Testament), not among *the Writings* (the third and last section). At that date, then, Daniel was considered a prophet, not a historian. Also, the Prophets were considered to be older. Indeed, one reason for the late dating of Daniel is that it was listed among the Writings in the later Jewish Talmud (A.D. 400). However, the normal Old Testament division by later Jewish scholars was *the Law* and *the Prophets* (see Dan. 9:2 , 11–13 ; Zech. 7:12 ; Matt. 5:17 ; Luke 24:27). The unconventional Talmud listing may have been designed for liturgical, topical, or literary uses (see Geisler, chap. 14).

Jesus confirmed that Daniel was a prophet. In fact, Jesus used the example of a prediction made by Daniel that was yet future in Jesus’ day. Looking ahead to the coming destruction of Jerusalem and the temple by the Roman army of Titus, Jesus referred to abomination that causes desolation,” which would be standing in the holy place of the temple (Matt. 24:15). And there is strong historical evidence that the Synoptic Gospels were written before A.D. 70 (*see* ACTS, HISTORICITY OF ; BIBLE CRITICISM ; NEW TESTAMENT, HISTORICITY OF). The evidence supports Jesus’ claim to be the Son of God. Such an intertwining of prophetic credentials means that to deny the predictive nature of Daniel’s prophecies is a step toward denial of the deity of Christ (*see* CHRIST, DEITY OF).

Dead Sea manuscripts support an early Daniel. A fragment of Daniel from possibly the second century B.C. was found among the Dead Sea scrolls at Qumran. Since this was only a copy, it would place the book earlier.

Daniel the man is mentioned in Ezekiel 14:14 , 20 ; 28:3 . Even critics recognize Ezekiel as contemporary with the sixth century. But if the only Daniel the prophet known in Old Testament times came from the sixth century, there is no reason to reject his prophecies as coming from this period as well. This is particularly true in view of the vivid, firsthand, eyewitness nature of the book.

The Jewish Talmud attributes the book of Daniel to the prophet Daniel who lived in the sixth century B.C. This lends the support of later Jewish scholars.

Even a Late Daniel Accurately Predicted. Even a late date of about 170 B.C. would make some of Daniel's predictions still future and supernaturally accurate. Some of his most sensational predictions were fulfilled at the time of Christ. Daniel 9:24–27 predicted that Christ would die, having made “reconciliation for iniquity” and having brought in “everlasting righteousness” some 483 years after 444 B.C. According to the Jewish lunar year of 360 days there are exactly 483 between 444 B.C. and 33 A.D. For added to the 477 lunar years (444 + 33) must be another six years (= 483). There are five more days (365) in an actual year than in a lunar year (360). And five days times 477 is 2385 days. That adds up to another six and one-half years (see HOEHNER, X).

Objections to a Predictive Daniel. *Jewish Scripture Lists Daniel as a “Writing.”* Why, critics ask, if Daniel was a prophet, is his book not listed among the Prophets in the Jewish Bible but only later among the Writings? As noted above, this was a late decision, about A.D. 400. Daniel was originally listed among the Prophets. In the first century A.D., the Jewish historian Josephus listed Daniel among the prophets (*Against Apion* 1.8). In the later division of the Prophets into Prophets and Writings it was understandable that Daniel would fit in the Writings. Chapters 1 through 6 contains much history. Also, Daniel was a prophet by gift but not office, since he had a significant political role to play in the Babylonian government.

The Theology Is Too Highly Developed. Some critics assert that Daniel could not have written in the sixth century because the book's highly developed view of angels, the Messiah, the resurrection, and the final judgment are known to exist only in a later period.

This argument begs the question. If Daniel is an earlier book, then Daniel is proof that this “highly developed” theology existed at that time. Job and Isaiah are earlier books, and they refer to the resurrection (Job 19:25 , 26 ; Isa. 26:19). Both Malachi and Zechariah were written before the second century, and they refer to the Messiah (Zech. 3:1 ; 6:12 ; Mal. 3:1 ; 4:2). Angels are prominent in Genesis (see chaps. 18 , 19 , 28) and throughout Zechariah.

Daniel Allegedly Erred. Some critics charge that the book makes historical errors. This argument shows that what is actually in dispute is not the dating of Daniel, but the divine inspiration of Scripture. It would make more sense if an early Daniel would be historically inaccurate. A later writer would know what happened.

However, none of the errors charged to Daniel has stood (see Archer, 380–93). For example, according to Daniel 5:31 , the kingdom of Belshazzar fell to an invading army, and “Darius the Mede” became king. However, modern scholars have found no mention of such a person in ancient documents. Some modern scholars claim that the author of Daniel mistakenly thought that the Medes, rather than the Persians, conquered Babylon. They claim that this author confused Darius I, king of Persia (521–486 B.C.), with the conqueror of Babylon and identified this figure as Darius the Mede. This, they charged, appears to be an error in Daniel's account.

Modern archaeological evidence (see ARCHAEOLOGY, OLD TESTAMENT) shows that Darius the Mede could easily have been a different person than Darius I of Persia. Two men equally fit Daniel's references. Cyrus the Great, who ruled a united Medo-Persian empire, may well have been from the Median side of this alliance and could have been known outside official

communications as Darius the Mede. That Daniel identifies this Darius as Median fits the Persian context where that would have been noteworthy.

A better candidate who has turned up in cuneiform texts is *Gubaru* , who was appointed by Cyrus to be governor over all of Babylonia. The common practice in Babylonian and Persian aristocracy, particularly for emigrants, was for private names to reflect an individual's background and family, while an official name represented political realities of the person's new allegiances. Daniel was known in his official capacities as Belteshazzar (Dan. 1:7). Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego were Babylonian names for the Hebrew men Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah.

In the article “Daniel in the Historians' Den,” William Sierichs, Jr. affirms that Belshazzar was not the “son” of Nebuchadnezzar, and “Belshazzar was not the ruler as the Book of Daniel claims, and he was never king” (*TSR*, vol. 7.4, p. 8). But even the radical critic Dr. Philip R. Davies has admitted that both are “weak arguments” (Philip R. Davies, *Daniel* [Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985], p. 31). He wrote:

Critical commentaries, especially around the turn of the century, made much of the fact that Belshazzar was neither a son of Nebuchadnezzar nor king of Babylon. This is still sometimes repeated as a charge against the historicity of Daniel, and resisted by conservative scholars. But it has been clear since 1924 (J. A. Montgomery, *Daniel*, International Critical Commentary [Edinburgh: T and T Clark/New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1927], pp. 66–67) that although Nabonidus was the last king of the Neo-Babylonian dynasty, Belshazzar was effectively ruling Babylon. In this respect, then, Daniel is correct. The literal meaning of ‘son’ should not be pressed. . .” (pp. 30–31).

Daniel's Vocabulary is From a Later Period. Linguistic critics find terms in Daniel that supposedly were not in use until the second century B.C. It is alleged that such words as *harp* , *sackbut* , and *psaltery* originated in the later Maccabean period (second century B.C.) and not the sixth century. Old Testament scholar R. K. Harrison observes that “this argument no longer constitutes a problem in the criticism of the book, because as [William F.] Albright has shown, it is now well recognized that Greek culture had penetrated the Near East long before the Neo-Babylonian period” (Harrison, 1126). Further, this argument is logically a fallacy from ignorance. Just because a word is not *known* to have been used at any earlier period doesn't mean it was not, unless we have omniscience about language use throughout a past society. And as more is known linguistically about ancient cultures, scholars are finding evidence of earlier usage (see Archer, 380–93).

Conclusion. There is strong evidence that Daniel's predictions come from the sixth century B.C., making them amazing predictions of the course of history from Babylon through Medo-Persia, Greece and Rome to after the time of Christ. Critics gain nothing by postdating Daniel. Their latest date still demands that Daniel wrote outstanding examples of supernatural predictive prophecy (Daniel 9). If those are true prophecies, why not the others?

Sources

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Darius the Mede. See DANIEL, DATING OF .

Darrow, Clarence. Clarence Darrow (1857–1938) was a well-known attorney practicing criminal law through the early twentieth century. He is best known for his defense of a man who was charged with teaching evolution (*see* EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL) in public schools. Through the Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee (1925), Darrow was able to champion his own strongly held views as an evolutionist and agnostic (*see* AGNOSTICISM). The Christian statesman William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925) represented the state and died a few days after the verdict.

The Real Darrow. Darrow has been widely quoted as saying, “It is bigotry for public schools to teach only one theory of origins” (McIver, 1–13). Wendell Bird, whose 1978 *Yale Law Review* article has been responsible for many of the citations of this alleged quotation, has subsequently recognized that this statement probably is not authentic.

Darrow also has been misquoted to the effect that he believed creation was a scientific view. He declared at the Scopes trial that children should have “both” creation and evolution. He meant evolution should be taught as science and creation as theology. This fits his argument at the trial and his declaration a few years later: “In fact, there is no other theory to teach regarding the origin of the various animal species, including man” (Darrow, 275).

Darrow and the Charge of Bigotry. He did believe that passing and defending the Tennessee creation law was “bigotry” and used the word *bigotry* or *bigot* six times on only two pages of trial transcript (Hilleary, 75, 87). Bryan said on the witness stand, “I am perfectly willing that the world shall know that these gentlemen have no other purpose than ridiculing every Christian who believes in the Bible.” Darrow snapped back, “We have the purpose of preventing *bigots* and ignoramuses from controlling the education of the United States and you know it, and that is all” (ibid., 299, emphasis added).

In another place Darrow argued that “Unless there is left enough of the spirit of freedom in the state of Tennessee, and in the United States, there is not a single line of any constitution that

can withstand *bigotry* and ignorance when it seeks to destroy the rights of the individual; and bigotry and ignorance are ever active” (ibid., 75, emphasis added).

Darrow even refers to Thomas Jefferson , asking, “Can a legislative body say, ‘You cannot read a book or take a lesson, or make a talk on science until you first find out whether what you are saying [is] against Genesis. . . .’ It could—except for the work of Thomas Jefferson, which has been woven into every state constitution of the Union, and has stayed there like the flaming sword to protect the rights of man against ignorance and *bigotry*” (ibid., 83).

At another point Darrow appealed to the judge, pleading, “Your honor knows that the fires that have been lighted in America to kindle religious *bigotry* and hate. . . . You know that there is no suspicion which possesses the mind of men like *bigotry* and ignorance and hatred” (ibid., 87, emphasis added). Even the lawyers opposing Darrow took note of his use of the word *bigots* , saying, “They say it is sponsored by a lot of religious *bigots* . Mr. Darrow said that, substantially that” (ibid., 197, emphasis added).

These citations leave no doubt that Darrow believed that those who produced, promoted, and defended the Tennessee anti-evolution law were bigots for denying the right to teach evolution in the public schools, even though creation was not being taught. It is interesting to observe precisely what Darrow himself was promoting to see if he himself remains above the charge of bigotry.

What Darrow Was Defending. Darrow obviously was challenging the law in order to establish the teaching of evolution. Yet, even evolutionists acknowledge that “the Dayton public schools were only teaching one view—evolution—and that was what Darrow was trying to defend” (McIver, 9). If so, then Darrow’s plea, “Let them have both. Let them both be taught” rings hollow. Certainly he did not advocate that the Genesis account be taught in public schools, even as theology. Darrow was categorically opposed to teaching religion in the public schools.

Darrow’s reference to Jefferson is infelicitous, since Jefferson believed that “all men were created . . .” and even refers to the “Creator” in *The Declaration of Independence* . Jefferson would be surprised to return to America and find that a new society has declared it unconstitutional to teach the truths of the *Declaration of Independence* in public schools. Jefferson himself set up a department of divinity in his state supported University of Virginia and signed into law a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians (1803) to pay a Catholic missionary to do mission work with them.

Evaluation. The view that only evolution is scientific and only creation is religious is a form of definitional bigotry. If creation is not scientific, then most of the major scientists between 1620 and 1860 were not scientific when they said that scientific evidence points to a Creator (*see* CREATION AND ORIGINS).

As argued elsewhere (*see* ORIGINS, SCIENCE OF), creation is as scientific as is macro-evolution (Geisler, *Origin Science*, chaps. 6, 7). Neither creation nor macro-evolution represents an *empirical* science. No creature observed the origin of the universe and life, and it is not being repeated today. However, both creationist and evolutionist views are “scientific” in the sense of

forensic science. They are simply speculative reconstructions of past unobserved events on the basis of remaining evidence. To argue that we can allow public school science teachers to teach evolution is to allow speculation about possible natural causes but not possible intelligent causes. By this same logic, archaeologists are not scientific when they posit an intelligent cause for ancient pottery. Darrow would have been more consistent in defending scientific inquiry and academic freedom if he had actually said the statement attributed to him: "It is bigotry for public schools to teach only one theory of origins!"

Sources

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Darwin, Charles. Charles Robert Darwin (1809–1882) was born in Shrewsbury, England, the son of a physician. As a naturalist, he won sponsors and government backing for an expedition on the military sailing ship HMS Beagle, where he made his famous observations on the differences in finches. Later he used what he had learned on this ship as evidence for his theory of evolution (see CREATION AND ORIGINS ; CREATION, VIEWS OF ; EVOLUTION ; EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL ; EVOLUTION, CHEMICAL ; MISSING LINKS).

Darwin is most famous for his *On the Origin of Species* (1859), in which he suggested in the last lines of the first edition that "whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity," therein, "life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed [by the Creator] into a few forms or into one . . . from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved." The bracketed phrase was added in the second edition of *Origin*. Not until his later work, *The Descent of Man* (1871), did Darwin proclaim that humans too had evolved by natural processes from lower forms of life. This view caused a revolution in the sciences, the reverberations of which are still being felt.

It was a turning point in modern thought because, in the minds of many, Darwin gave the first plausible explanation of how evolution could have occurred. By applying the principle of natural selection (the survival of the fittest) to variations within populations, Darwin was able to argue persuasively that over long periods of time small changes added up to large ones. These large changes can account for the origin of new species without the direct intervention of a supernatural Power, except perhaps to get the whole process going.

Evolution of Darwin's God. Darwin began as a Christian theist, was baptized in the Church of England, and despite his rejection of Christianity, was buried in Westminster Abbey. Darwin's life is a microcosm of the increasing disbelief of the late eighteenth century (*Darwin's Early Religious Training*).

Although an Anglican, Darwin was sent to a school conducted by a Unitarian minister (Moore, 315). He later entered the University of Cambridge in 1828 where, his father had decided, he should prepare for the ministry (ibid.). At this early age, and with the aid of Pearson's *Exposition of the Creed* and Bishop Sumner's *Evidence of Christianity Derived from Its Nature and Reception* (1824), "Darwin abandoned whatever were his scruples about professing belief in all the doctrines of the Church" (ibid.). Nonetheless, Darwin was deeply impressed with William Paley's *A View of the Evidences of Christianity* (1794); and *Natural Theology*; or, *Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity* (1802).

Darwin's Original Theistic Beliefs. He accepted Paley's design argument (see TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT). In his *Autobiography* he referred to his Journal entry "that whilst standing in the midst of the grandeur of a Brazilian forest 'it is not possible to give an adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, admiration, and evolution which fill and elevate the mind.'" He adds, "I remember my conviction that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 91).

Darwin recognized "the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far backward and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity." Thus, "when reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Theist." Darwin acknowledged that he once had been a creationist. He even spoke of it as a view "which most naturalists until recently entertained, and which I formerly entertained" (Darwin, 30). "This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the *Origin of Species*; and it is since that time that it has very gradually become weaker" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 92–93).

Darwin's Rejection of Christianity. By 1835, before Darwin set sail on the *Beagle* (in 1836), he was yet a creationist. Darwin describes his own religious descent in his *Autobiography*. He wrote, "Whilst on board the *Beagle* [October 1836–January 1839] I was quite orthodox, and I remember being heartily laughed at by several of the officers (though themselves orthodox) for quoting the bible as an unanswerable authority on some point of morality." However, he did not believe the Bible was an unanswerable authority on science at this time. According to Ernst Mayr, Darwin had become an evolutionist some time between 1835 and 1837 (Mayr, x). "By 1844, his views [on evolution] had reached considerable maturity, as shown by his manuscript 'Essay'" (ibid.). Charles Darwin's son and biographer, Francis Darwin said that "Although Darwin had nearly all the key ideas of the *Origin* in mind as early as 1838, he deliberated for twenty years before committing himself publicly to evolution" (F. Darwin, 3.18). Only a decade later (1848) Darwin was fully convinced of evolution, defiantly declaring to J. D. Hooker: "I don't care what you say, my species theory is all gospel!" (cited by Moore, 211).

Darwin's declining Christian beliefs began with an erosion of the trustworthiness of the Bible. It is true that as late as 1848 he read Harvard's Professor Andrew Norton (*The Evidence of the Genuineness of the Gospels*) who argued that the Gospels "remain essentially the same as they were originally composed" and that "they have been ascribed to their true authors" (Moore, 212). However, his faith in the Old Testament had eroded some years before this (see BIBLICAL CRITICISM).

The acceptance of negative higher criticism. But "I had gradually come, by this time to see that the Old Testament from its manifestly false history of the world, with its Tower of Babel, the rainbow as a sign, etc., etc., and from its attribution to God the feelings of a revengeful tyrant, was no more to be trusted than the sacred books of the Hindoos, or the beliefs of any barbarian" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 85).

The acceptance of antismaterialism. Both Benedict Spinoza in 1670 and David Hume a century later had attacked the basis of supernatural intervention in the world. Darwin added, "By further reflection that the clearest evidence would be requisite to make any sane man believe in miracles by which Christianity is supported—that the more we know of the fixed laws of nature the more incredible do miracles become—that the men of that time were ignorant and credulous to a degree almost incomprehensible by us—that the Gospels cannot be proved to have been written simultaneously with the events—that they differ in many important details, far too important as it seemed to me to be admitted as the usual inaccuracies of eyewitnesses—by such reflections as these . . . I gradually came to disbelieve in Christianity as a divine revelation" (*Autobiography*, 86).

Nonetheless, Darwin added, "I was very unwilling to give up my belief. . . . thus disbelief crept over me at a very slow rate, but was at last complete. The rate was so slow that I felt no distress, and have never since doubted even for a single second that my conclusion was correct" (*ibid.*, 87).

The "damnable doctrine" of hell. Darwin notes that the orthodox belief in hell was a particular influence in his rejection of Christianity. He wrote: "I can indeed hardly see how anyone ought to wish Christianity to be true; for if so plain language of the text seems to show that the men who do not believe, and this would include my Father, Brother and almost all my best friends, will be everlastingly punished. And this is a damnable doctrine" (*ibid.*, 87).

The death of Darwin's daughter. Darwin's increased skepticism was completed by the death of his beloved daughter, Anne in 1851. Biographer James Moore notes that "Two strong emotions, anger and grief, in the *Autobiography* mark off the years from 1848 to 1851 as the period when Darwin finally renounced his faith" (Moore, 209). This, of course, was just after his view in evolution had solidified (1844–1848) and before he wrote his famous *Origins* (1859).

Although Darwin's heirs suppressed the effect this death had on Darwin, his own words betray its impact (see Moore, 220–23). Connected to the doctrine of eternal punishment, Darwin could see no reconciliation between the life of a perfect child and a vengeful God (*ibid.*, 220). Referring to himself as a "horrid wretch," one of the condemned, in May 1856 he warned a young entomologist: "I have heard Unitarianism called a feather-bed to catch a falling Christian;

& I think you are now on just such a feather bed, but I believe you will fall much lower & lower" (cited by Moore, 221). A month later, Darwin referred to himself as "the Devil's Chaplain," a satirical figure of speech of a confirmed unbeliever (Moore, 222; see EVIL, PROBLEM OF).

Darwin's Descent. Darwin gradually discarded theism for deism, leaving the single act of divine intervention for the creation of the first form or forms of life. This was apparently his view at the time of *On the Origin of Species* (1859) where, in the second edition he spoke of "life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one . . . from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved" (emphasis added).

Paley's design argument rejected. Although Darwin clung to a deistic God who created the world but let it operate by "fixed natural laws," gradually he came to reject even the cogency of the design argument. He said he was "driven" to the conclusion that "the old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection had been discovered. . . . there seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws" (*ibid.*, 87). Darwin wrote: "I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance" (F. Darwin, 1.279; 2.105).

With chance as his only continuing faith, the naturalist ventured so far as to call natural selection "my deity," For to believe in miraculous creations or in the "continued intervention of creative power," said Darwin, "is to make 'my deity "Natural Selection" superfluous' and to hold the Deity—if such there be—accountable for phenomena which are rightly attributed only to his magnificent laws" (cited by Moore, 322). Here Darwin not only stated his deism but signaled his growing agnosticism by the phrase "if such there be."

Finite Godism? Darwin seemed in the later stages of his deism to flirt with a finite god (see FINITE GODISM) like that John Stuart Mill had embraced. As early as 1871 in *The Descent*, Darwin appeared to deny belief in an infinitely powerful God. He wrote: "*Belief in God—Religion.* There is no evidence that man was aboriginally endowed with the ennobling belief in the existence of an Omnipotent God" (*Descent*, 302). Here he hints at finite godism. If so, it was short-lived; Darwin definitely eventuated an agnostic (see AGNOSTICISM).

Agnosticism. By 1879 Darwin was an agnostic, writing: "I think that generally (and more and more as I grow older), but not always, that an Agnostic would be the more correct description of my state of mind" (cited by Moore, 204). Eventually, he wrote: "The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an Agnostic" (Darwin, *Autobiography*, 84).

His agnosticism notwithstanding, Darwin clearly denies ever being an atheist. He said, "In my most extreme fluctuations I have never been an atheist in denying the existence of God" (cited by Moore, 204). Historians reject the apocryphal story of Darwin's deathbed conversion.

As late as 1879, many years after the *Descent* (1871), Darwin declared, “It seems to me absurd to doubt that a man may be an ardent Theist and an evolutionist” (Letter 7, May 1879). Darwin himself was content to remain an agnostic.

Evaluation. In contrast to the dogmatism of many contemporary evolutionists who claim “evolution is a fact,” Darwin was more reserved, at least in his published writings.

Positive Aspects of Darwin’s Views. Darwin should be commended for being generally careful not to overstate his case. Certainly this is the case in *On the Origin of Species*.

Evolution is only a theory. Darwin acknowledged that his view was a theory, not a fact. He called it the “theory of evolution” as opposed to the “theory of Creation,” phrases he used many times in *On the Origin of Species* (e.g., 235, 435, 437). Technically, macro-evolution is more an unconfirmed hypothesis than a theory (see EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL). Many, including some evolutionists, believe it is an unfalsifiable tautology. Robert H. Peters, in *The American Naturalist*, stated that evolutionary theories “are actually tautologies and, as such, cannot make empirical testable predictions. They are not scientific theories at all” (Peters, 1). Others, like Stephen Toulmin and Langdon Gilkey have come to similar conclusions, calling it a “scientific myth” (Gilkey, 39).

Both sides should be considered. In contrast to many current evolutionists, Darwin believed that both evolution and its logical antithesis of creation should be considered, weighing the evidence carefully for both. In the “Introduction” to *Origin* Darwin stated: “For I am well aware that scarcely a single point is discussed in this volume on which facts cannot be adduced, often apparently leading to conclusions directly opposite to those at which I have arrived.” He adds, “A fair result can be obtained only by fully stating and balancing the facts and arguments on both sides of each question; and this is here impossible.” This seems to support a two-model theory which many creationists suggest for public schools, but the mandating of which was rejected by the Supreme Court (*Edwards*, 19 June, 1987).

Micro-evolution was confirmed. Darwin is credited, even by creationists, with confirming the existence of small changes in the natural development of species. They are even observable, as his study of the finches reveals. While creationists differ with Darwin as to whether these small changes can add up to large ones by natural selection over long periods of time, Darwin and others should be credited with the demise of the older platonic view of fixed forms on the level of what biologists call species.

The law of natural selection was explained. Darwin also correctly saw the valuable function that natural selection plays in the development of life. The survival of the fittest is a fact of animal life, as a perusal of an African nature film will reveal. Again, creationists and evolutionists differ over just how much change natural selection can make and whether it is upward. But there is agreement that natural selection can and does make some significant biological changes in the development of life.

“Missing links” were noted. Darwin was well aware of the fact that the evidence for (or against) evolution was in the fossil record and that there were gaping holes in it (see below). He, of course, hoped that future finds would fill in these gaps and confirm his “theory.”

Negative Aspects. A more complete critique of biological and human evolution is found in the article Evolution, Biological. Here focus will be on the failings of Darwin’s personal views.

The lack of fossil evidence. Sensing the lack of intermediate forms in the fossil record, Darwin confessed: “Geology assuredly does not reveal any such finely graduated organic change, and this is perhaps the most obvious and serious objection which can be urged against the theory [of evolution]” (Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 152, emphasis added). Darwin confessed that we do not find “an infinite number of those fine transitional forms which, on our theory, have connected all the past and present species of the same group into one long and branching chain of life” (ibid., 161). He attributed this to the scarcity of the “geological record as a history of the world imperfectly kept” (ibid.) and, others, to the alleged sparsity of transitional forms. But this is a virtually unfalsifiable argument from silence and begs the question in favor of transitional forms being there to begin with. The reality is that there are no missing links, but a missing chain, with only a few links here and a few there.

The fossil record is the only real evidence of what *actually did occur*, as opposed to what *could have* happened, so this is a very serious objection. And the subsequent period of about 140 years has not been friendly to Darwin. In spite of thousands of fossil finds, to borrow a term from Fred Hoyle, “the evolutionary record leaks like a sieve” (Hoyle, 77). But Harvard paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould admitted that “the extreme rarity of transitional forms in the fossil record persists as the trade secret of paleontology. The evolutionary trees that adorn our textbooks have data only at the tips and nodes of their branches; the rest is inference, however reasonable, not the evidence of fossils” (Gould, 14). Indeed, the lack of evidence for Darwin’s theory has forced many contemporary evolutionists like Gould to resort to more speculative solutions such as “punctuated equilibria” where by nature takes big leaps in relatively short periods of time.

Micro-evolution does not prove macro-evolution. All that Darwin successfully showed was that small changes occur within specific forms of life, not that there is any evolution between major types. Even granting long periods of time, there is no real evidence for major changes. To cite Gould again, “The history of most fossil species includes two features particularly inconsistent with gradualism:

1. *Stasis.* Most species exhibit no directional change during their tenure on earth. They appear in the fossil record looking much the same as when they disappear; morphological change is usually limited and directionless.

2. *Sudden appearance.* In any local area, a species does not arise gradually by the steady transformation of its ancestors; it appears all at once, fully formed (Gould, ibid., 13–14).

The fossil evidence clearly gives a picture of mature, fully functional creatures suddenly appearing and staying very much the same. This is evidence of creation, not evolution.

Leaps are evidence of creation. In view of the great omissions in the fossil record, Darwin's own statements are self-incriminating. He said, "he who believes that some ancient form was transformed suddenly . . . enter[s] into the realms of miracles, and leave[s] those of science" (cited by Denton, 59). Even as a student, Darwin, commenting on Sumner's *Evidences of Christianity*, said that "when one sees a religion set up, that has no existing prototype . . . it gives great probability to its divine origin." As Howard Gruber put it, "Nature makes no jumps, but God does. Therefore, if we want to know whether something that interests us is of natural or supernatural [origin], we must ask: Did it arise gradually out of that which came before, or suddenly without any evident natural cause?" (cited *ibid.*). But clearly by Darwin's own premises, then, macro-evolution does not follow, for he admits that there are great jumps in the fossil record, which are a sign of creation, not evolution.

Darwin made a false analogy. Much of the persuasiveness of Darwin's view came from the apparently plausible argument that if artificial selection can make significant small changes in a short time, then surely natural selection can make large changes in a long period of time. But as E. S. Russell noted, "the action of man in selective breeding is not analogous to the action of 'natural selection,' but almost its direct opposite." For "Man has an aim or an end in view; 'natural selection' can have none. Man picks out the individuals he wishes to cross, choosing them by the characteristics he seeks to perpetuate or enhance." Rather, "He protects them and their issue by all means in his power, guarding them thus from the operation of natural selection, which would speedily eliminate many freaks; he continues his active and purposeful selection from generation to generation until he reaches, if possible, his goal." But "Nothing of this kind happens, or can happen, through the blind process of differential elimination and differential survival which we miscall natural selection (cited in Moore, 124). Thus, a central pillar of Darwin's theory is based on a false analogy (see EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL for further development of this point).

Darwin admitted to serious objections. Darwin dedicated a whole chapter of *On the Origin of Species* to what he called "a crowd of difficulties" (80). For example, "Can we believe that natural selection could produce . . . an organ so wonderful as the eye" (*ibid.*). How could organisms that need it survive without it while it was evolving over thousand or millions of years? Indeed, most complex organs and organisms must have all of the parts functioning together at once from the beginning. Any gradual acquiring of them would be fatal to their functioning. Further, "can instincts be acquired and modified through natural selection?" (*ibid.*). Darwin admits the difficulties with evolution that "some of them are so serious that to this day I can hardly reflect on them without being in some degree staggered" (*ibid.*).

Evidence reveals separate ancestors. Interestingly, Darwin himself acknowledged the misleading nature of analogy his view was based on. Elaborating of his oft quoted last words of the *Origin* that God created "one" or a "few" forms of life, Darwin admits two revealing things. First, he acknowledged some eight to ten created forms. He said, "I believe that animals are descended from at most four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number" (Darwin, *Origin of Species*, 241). Beyond this, he admitted that one can only argue by analogy, adding: "Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype. *But analogy may be a deceitful guide*" (*ibid.*,

emphasis added). This is a very revealing admission in view of the demonstrably false analogy used between artificial and natural selection.

Darwin's theory not derived from nature. Even some evolutionists admit that Darwin did not derive his theory from the study of nature but from a naturalistic worldview. George Grinnell wrote: "I have done a great deal of work on Darwin and can say with some assurance that Darwin also did not derive his theory from nature but rather superimposed a certain philosophical world-view on nature and then spent 20 years trying to gather facts to make it stick" (Grinnell, 44). This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that the Federal Court ruled in the "Scopes II" trial (McLean, 22 January 1982) that creation is not science because, for one thing, it has a non-scientific source—the Bible. The judge ruled that creation could not be taught alongside evolution because " 'creation science' . . . has as its unmentioned reference the first eleven chapters of the Book of Genesis" (cited in Geisler, 173).

One cannot help but wonder why creation is not scientific because it has a nonscientific source, whereas Darwin's view is. The truth is that a scientific theory does not need a scientific source but only some possible or actual scientific support. As the author pointed out in testimony at the "Scopes II" trial, many valid scientific views had nonscientific, even religious, sources. Nikola Tesla's idea for the AC motor came from a vision while reading a pantheistic poet. And Kekule's model of the benzene molecule was derived from a vision of a snake biting its tail (*ibid.*, 116–117).

Darwin's View Is Tantamount to Atheism. Although Darwin, and many Darwinists, stoutly deny that Darwin's view is in principle atheistic, the charge has been laid very seriously at his door. The Princeton scholar, Charles Hodge (1797–1878), in a penetrating analysis, asked and answered his own question: "What is Darwinism? It is Atheism. This does not mean that Mr. Darwin himself and all who adopt his views are atheists; but it means that his theory is atheistic, that the exclusion of design from nature is . . . tantamount to atheism" (Hodge, 177). Hodge's logic is challenging. Evolution excludes design, and if there is no design in nature then there is no need for a Designer of nature. So, protests to the contrary, evolution is in principle an atheistic theory, since it excludes the need for an intelligent Creator (see COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ; FLEW, ANTONY).

Even many evolutionists acknowledge that Darwin's scenario of a "warm little pond" in which first life spontaneously generated excludes God entirely from the realm of biology. He wrote: "It is often said that all the conditions for the first production of a living organism are now present which could ever have been present." Thus, spontaneous generation would be possible if "we could conceive in some warm little pond with all sorts of ammonia and phosphoric salts, light, heat, electricity present that a protein was formed ready to undergo still more complex changes" (cited by F. Darwin, 3.18). Francis Darwin admitted that "Darwin never claimed his theory could explain the origin of life, but the implication was there. *Thus, not only was God banished from the creation of species but from the entire realm of biology*" (*ibid.*). What need for a Creator? All one need do is posit what many long believed, that the material universe was eternal and there appears to be no place for a First Cause, for God. There is, of course, mounting evidence against both spontaneous generation of first life (see EVOLUTION, CHEMICAL) and an

eternal universe (*see* BIG BANG THEORY ; KALAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT). And, hence, there is need for God, Darwinism notwithstanding (*see* GOD, EVIDENCES FOR).

Reasons for denying Christianity were invalid. Not only were Darwin's deism and agnosticism unjustified, but so was his rejection of Christianity. For it was based on a prevailing negative higher criticism (*see* BIBLICAL CRITICISM) of his day, which was prearchaeological and has long since been discredited.

Likewise, Darwin wrongly assumed that the God of the Old Testament was vengeful and not loving, something contrary to the Old Testament statement of God's love, mercy, and forgiveness (*see* Exod. 20:6 ; Jonah 4:2). Indeed, God's love is mentioned more in the Old Testament than in the New Testament.

Further, Darwin's concept of hell was severely truncated. The very idea that hell is unjust implies there must be an absolutely just God. And an absolutely just God must punish sin.

What is more, Darwin seemed to have no concept of hell as a consequence of a loving God not forcing free creatures to believe in him contrary to their choice.

Finally, Darwin's family downplays the fact that once Darwin had given up his Christian belief he could not cope with the death of his beloved daughter. The very time when he needed the Christian hope of the resurrection (*see* RESURRECTION, EVIDENCE FOR) and reunion with loved ones, it was not there because his increasing antisupernaturalism had eliminated any firm basis on which he could believe it. Instead, he turned on God—whatever was left of him—and blamed God for being “vengeful.” Such is the condition of an ungrateful and unbelieving heart (*cf.* Rom. 1:18f.).

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Days of Genesis. *See* GENESIS, DAYS OF .

Dead Sea Scrolls. Discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls (hereafter DSS) at Qumran, beginning in 1949, had significant apologetic implications. These ancient texts, hidden in pots in cliff-top caves by a monastic religious community, confirm the reliability of the Old Testament text. They provide significant portions of Old Testament books—even entire books—that were copied and studied by the Essenes. These manuscripts date from as early as the third century B.C. and so give the earliest window so far found into the texts of the Old Testament books and their predictive prophecies. The Qumran texts have become an important witness for the divine origin of the Bible (*see* PROPHECY, AS PROOF OF BIBLE). They provide further evidence against the negative biblical criticism (*see* BIBLE CRITICISM) of such crucial books as Daniel and Isaiah (*see* DANIEL, DATING OF ; OLD TESTAMENT MANUSCRIPTS ; REDACTION CRITICISM, OLD TESTAMENT).

The DSS manuscripts date from the third century B.C. to the first century A.D. They include one complete Old Testament book, Isaiah (*see* ISAAH, DEUTERO), and thousands of fragments, which together represent every Old Testament book except Esther. William F. Albright called this “the greatest manuscript discovery of modern times” (*see* Trever, 55).

Dating the Dead Sea Scrolls. Important, though not crucial, to the apologetic value of the DSS are their dates. Dating used several lines of evidence.

Carbon 14 Dating. Carbon 14 dating is a reliable form of scientific dating when applied to uncontaminated material several thousand years old. Since it destroys a portion of the material tested, this process is used sparingly. Half of a two-ounce piece of linen wrapping from a scroll in cave 1 was tested by Dr. W. F. Libby of the University of Chicago in 1950 to give a general idea of the age of the collection. Results indicated an age of 1917 years with a 200-year (10 percent) variant, which left the date somewhere between 168 B.C. and A.D. 233.

Paleographical and Orthographical Dating. Paleography (ancient writing forms) and orthography (spelling) were more helpful, indicating that some manuscripts were inscribed before 100 B.C. Albright studied photographs of the complete Isaiah scroll and set its date at

around 100 B.C. “What an absolutely incredible find!” he wrote. “And there can happily not be the slightest doubt in the world about the genuineness of the manuscript” (ibid., 55).

Archaeological Dating. Collaborative evidence for an early date came from archaeology. Pottery accompanying the manuscripts was Late Hellenistic (ca. 150–63 B.C.) and Early Roman (ca. 63 B.C. to A.D. 100). Coins found in the monastery ruins proved by their inscriptions to have been minted between 135 B.C. and A.D. 135. The weave and pattern of the cloth supported an early date. Evidence also came from the Murabba’at Discoveries south of Bethlehem, where self-dated manuscripts were discovered in 1952. Bearing dates from A.D. 132–35, these proved to be paleographically younger than the DSS (Zeitlin). In the end there was no reasonable doubt that the Qumran manuscripts came from the century before Christ and the first century A.D. Thus, they are 1000 years older than the Masoretic manuscripts of the tenth century. Before 1947, the Hebrew text was based on three partial and one complete manuscript dating from about A.D. 1000. Now, thousands of fragments are available, as well as complete books, containing large sections of the Old Testament from one millennium before the time of the Masoretic manuscripts.

Support for the Masoretic Text. The nature and number of these finds are of critical value for establishing the true text (see OLD TESTAMENT MANUSCRIPTS). With innumerable fragments of the entire Old Testament, there are abundant samples with which to compare the Masoretic Text. The evidence points to the following general conclusions.

Confirmation of the Hebrew Text. The scrolls give an overwhelming confirmation of the faithfulness with which the Hebrew text was copied through the centuries. By the tenth-century Masoretic copies, few errors had crept in. Millar Burrows, in *The Dead Sea Scrolls*, writes, “It is a matter of wonder that through something like a thousand years the text underwent so little alteration. As I said in my first article on the scroll, ‘Herein lies its chief importance, supporting the fidelity of the Masoretic tradition’ (Burrows, 304). R. Laird Harris points out that “evidently the difference between the standard text of A.D. 900 and the text of 100 B.C. is not nearly so great as that between the Neutral and Western text in the New Testament study” (Harris, 99). Gleason Archer observes that the two copies of Isaiah discovered in Qumran Cave 1 “proved to be word for word identical with our standard Hebrew Bible in more than 95 percent of the text. The 5 percent of variation consisted chiefly of obvious slips of the pen and variations in spelling” (Archer, 19). To return to the original and “all important question” framed by Old Testament scholar Frederic Kenyon (1863–1952) a generation ago, it may now be more confidently asserted than ever before that the modern Hebrew text faithfully represents the Hebrew text as originally written by the authors of the Old Testament. Dead Sea discoveries have enabled us to answer this question with much greater assurance than was possible before 1948 (Bruce, 61–69).

Support for the Septuagint. Since the New Testament most often cites the Greek Septuagint (hereafter LXX) translation of the Old Testament, the reliability of this text is important, particularly where it is quoted in the New Testament. The DSS provide early support for the LXX and answers questions about variations between the Hebrew and LXX Greek:

LXX Septuagint

1. A fragment containing Deuteronomy 32:8 reads, “according to the number of the sons of God,” which is translated “angels of God” by the LXX, as in Genesis 6:4 (margin); Job 1:6; 2:1; and 38:7. The Masoretic Text reads, “according to the number of the children of Israel.”
2. The Masoretic Text of Exodus 1:5 reads “seventy souls,” whereas the LXX and its quotation in Acts 7:14 read “seventy-five souls.” A DSS fragment of Exodus 1:5 reads “seventy-five souls,” in agreement with the LXX.
3. Hebrews 1:6, “Let all God’s angels worship him” is a quote from the LXX of Deuteronomy 32:43. This quotation does not agree with the Masoretic Text, but DSS fragments containing this section tend to confirm the LXX.
4. Isaiah 9:6 reads, “she shall call his name” in the Masoretic Text, but the LXX and now the great Isaiah scroll read, “His name shall be called,” a matter of one less consonant of the Hebrew alphabet.
5. The Greek version of Jeremiah is sixty verses (one-eighth) shorter than the Hebrew text of Jeremiah. The fragment of Jeremiah supports these omissions.
6. In Cave 11 a copy of Psalm 151 was found, which was previously unknown in the Hebrew text, although it appeared in the Septuagint. Some apocryphal books were also found among the Hebrew manuscripts in the Qumran caves that had previously been known only in the LXX (Vermes, 296).

This should by no means be construed as a uniform picture, since there are not many deviants in the DSS from the Masoretic Text to begin with. In some cases the variants do not consistently agree with the LXX; in a few cases they do not agree at all. However, even Orinsky, who is one of the foremost defenders of the Masoretic Text against proposed emendations based on the DSS, admits, “The LXX translation, no less than the Masoretic Text itself, will have gained considerable respect as a result of the Qumran discoveries in those circles where it has long—overlong—been necessary” (cited in Wright, 121).

Light on the New Testament. Some DSS fragments have been identified as the earliest known pieces of the New Testament. Further, the messianic expectations reveal that the New Testament view of a personal messiah-God who would rise from the dead is in line with first-century Jewish thought.

The New Testament fragments? Jose O’Callahan, a Spanish Jesuit paleographer, made headlines around the world in 1972 when he announced that he had translated a piece of the Gospel of Mark on a DSS fragment. This was the earliest known piece of Mark. Fragments from cave 7 had previously been dated between 50 B.C. and A.D. 50 and listed under “not identified” and classified as “Biblical Texts.” O’Callahan eventually identified nine fragments. The center column in the following chart uses the numbering system established for manuscripts. For example, “7Q5” means fragment 5 from Qumran cave 7.

Mark 4:28	7Q6?	A.D . 50
Mark 6:48	7Q15	A.D . ?
Mark 6:52 , 53	7Q5	A.D . 50
Mark 12:17	7Q7	A.D . 50
Acts 27:38	7Q6?	A.D . 60
Romans 5:11 , 12	7Q9	A.D . 70+
1 Timothy 3:16 ; 4:1–3	7Q4	A.D . 70+
2 Peter 1:15	7Q10	A.D . 70+
James 1:23 , 24	7Q8	A.D . 70+

Both friend and critic acknowledged from the beginning that, if valid, O'Callahan's conclusions would revolutionize current New Testament theories. The *New York Times* reported: "If Father O'Callahan's theory is accepted, it would prove that at least one of the gospels—that of St. Mark—was written only a few years after the death of Jesus." United Press International (UPI) noted that his conclusions meant that "the people closest to the events—Jesus' original followers—found Mark's report accurate and trustworthy, not myth but true history" (ibid., 137). *Time* magazine quoted one scholar who claimed that, if correct, "they can make a bonfire of 70 tons of indigestible German scholarship" (Estrada, 136).

Of course, O'Callahan's critics object to his identification and have tried to find other possibilities. The fragmentary nature of the ms. makes it difficult to be dogmatic about identifications. Nonetheless, O'Callahan offers a plausible, albeit revolutionary, possibility. If the identification of even one of these fragments as New Testament is valid, then the implications for Christian apologetics are enormous. It would be shown that the Gospel of Mark was written within the life time of the apostles and contemporaries of the events.

A date before A.D . 50 leaves no time for mythological embellishment of the records. They would have to be accepted as historical. It would also show Mark to be one of the earlier Gospels. Further, since these manuscripts are not originals but copies, it would reveal that the New Testament was "published"—copied and disseminated—during the life time of the writers. It would also reveal the existence of the New Testament canon during this early period, with pieces representing every major section of the New Testament: Gospels, Acts, and both Pauline and General Epistles.

The fragment of 2 Peter would argue for the authenticity of this often disputed epistle. The absence of fragments of John's writings might indicate that they were written later (A.D . 80–90) in accordance with the traditional dates. With all these revolutionary conclusions it is little wonder that their authenticity is being challenged.

First-Century Jewish Messianic Expectations. The DSS have also yielded text that, while not referring to the Christ of the New Testament, have some interesting parallels, as well as some

significant differences. The similarities that confirm the New Testament picture accurately describes Jewish expectation of a personal, individual Messiah who would die and rise from the dead. A fragment called "*A Genesis Florilegium*" (4Q252) reflects belief in an individual Messiah who would be a descendant of David. "Column 5 (1) (the) Government shall not pass from the tribe of Judah. During Israel's dominion, (2) a Davidic descendant on the throne shall [not c]ease . . . until the Messiah of Righteousness, the Branch of (4) David comes" (see Eisenman, 89).

Even the deity of the Messiah is affirmed in the fragment known as "The Son of God" (4Q246), Plate 4, columns one and two: "Oppression will be upon the earth . . . [until] the King of the people of God arises, . . . and he shall become [gre]at upon the earth. [. . . All w]ill make [peace,] and all will serve [him.] He will be called [son of the Gr]eat [God;] by His name he shall be designated. . . . He will be called the son of God; they will call him son of the Most High" (ibid., 70).

"The Messiah of Heaven and Earth" fragment (4Q521) even speaks of the Messiah raising the dead: "(12) then He will heal the sick, resurrect the dead, and to the Meek announce glad tidings" (ibid., 23; cf. 63, 95).

The Dead Sea Scrolls also confirm that Qumran was not the source of early Christianity. There are significant differences between their concept of the "Teacher of Righteousness," apparently an Essene messianic hope, and the Jesus revealed in Scripture and early Christianity. The differences are enough to show that early Christianity was not just an offshoot of the Essenes, as has been theorized (see Billington, 8–10). The Essenes emphasized hating one's enemies; Jesus stressed love. The Essenes were exclusivistic regarding women, sinners, and outsiders; Jesus was inclusive. The Essenes were legalistic sabbatarians; Jesus was not. The Essenes stressed Jewish purification laws; Jesus attacked them. The Essenes believed two messiahs would come; Christians held that Jesus was the only one (see Charlesworth).

Conclusion. The DSS provide an important apologetic contribution toward establishing the general reliability of the Old Testament Hebrew text, as well as the earliest copies of parts of Old Testament books and even whole books. This is important in showing that the predictive prophecies of the Old Testament were indeed made centuries before they were literally fulfilled. Furthermore, the DSS provide possible support for the New Testament. They may contain the earliest known fragments of the New Testament, and they definitely contain references to messianic beliefs similar to those taught in the New Testament.

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Deconstructionism. See DERRIDA, JACQUES .

Deism. *Deism* is the belief in a God who made the world but who never interrupts its operations with supernatural events. It is a theism minus miracles (*see* MIRACLE). God does not interfere with his creation. Rather, he designed it to run independent of him by immutable natural laws (*see* SPINOZA, BENEDICT). In nature, he has also provided all that his creatures need to live.

Deism flourished in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries but began to die in the nineteenth century. Today its tenets live on in antinatural denial of miracles (*see* MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST), critical views of the Bible (*see* BIBLE CRITICISM), and the practice of those who believe in a supreme being who has little or nothing to do with their lives.

Deism flourished in Europe, especially France and England, and in late-eighteenth-century America (*see* Orr, chaps. 3–4). Some of the more prominent European deists were Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648), the Father of English deism; Matthew Tindal (1656–1733); John Toland (1670–1722), and Thomas Woolston (1669–1731). Some of the notable American deists were Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), Stephen Hopkins (1707–1785), Thomas Jefferson (1743–

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1826), and Thomas Paine (1737–1809). The effects of views of the American deists, especially Paine and Jefferson, are more widely felt today through the United States' political foundation and heritage (*see* Morais, chaps. 4, 5).

Various Kinds of Deism. All deists agree that there is one God, who created the world. All deists agree that God does not intervene in the world through supernatural acts. However, not all deists agree on God's concern for the world and the existence of an afterlife for human beings (*see* IMMORTALITY). Based on these differences, four types of deism are discernible. The four range from ascribing minimal concern on the part of God to allowing his maximum concern for the world without supernaturally intervening in it (Morais, 17, 85–126).

The God of No Concern. The first type of deism was largely of French origin. According to this view, God is not concerned with governing the world he made. He created the world and set it in motion, but has no regard for what happens to it after that.

The God of No Moral Concern. In the second form of deism, God is concerned with the ongoing happenings of the world but not with the moral actions of human beings. Man can act rightly or wrongly, righteously or wickedly, morally or immorally. It is of no concern to God.

The God of Moral Concern for This Life. The third type of deism maintains that God governs the world and does care about the moral activity of human beings. Indeed God insists on obedience to the moral law that God established in nature. However, there is no future after death.

The God of Moral Concern for This Life and the Next. The fourth type of deism contends that God regulates the world, expects obedience to the moral law grounded in nature, and has arranged for a life after death, with rewards for the good and punishments for the wicked. This view was common among both English and American deists.

Basic Beliefs. Although there are points upon which deists differ, beliefs they hold in common allow an understanding of their common worldview.

God. All deists agree that there is one God (*see* THEISM). This God is eternal, unchangeable, impassable, all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good, true, just, invisible, infinite—in short, completely perfect, lacking in nothing.

God is an absolute unity, not a trinity . God is only one person, not three persons. The Christian theistic concept of the trinity is false, if not meaningless. God does not exist as three coequal persons. Of this Jefferson scoffed that "the Trinitarian arithmetic that three are one and one is three" is "incomparable jargon." Paine believed that the trinitarian concept resulted in three Gods, and thus was polytheistic (*see* POLYTHEISM). In contrast, deists contend that God is one in nature and one in person.

The Origin of the Universe. The universe is the creation of God (*see* CREATION AND ORIGINS). Before the universe existed, there was nothing except God (*see* CREATION, VIEWS OF). He

brought everything into being. Hence, unlike God, the world is finite. It had a beginning while he has no beginning or end.

The universe operates by natural laws. These laws flow from the very nature of God (*see* ESSENTIALISM, DIVINE). Like him they are eternal, perfect, and immutable, representing the orderliness and constancy of his nature. They are rules by which God measures his activity and rules he expects to be the standard for his creation.

The Relation of God and the Universe. God is as different from the universe as a painter is from a painting, a watchmaker is from a watch, and a sculptor is from a sculpture (*see* TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT). But, like a painting, watch, and sculpture, the universe reveals many things about God. Through its design it displays that there exists a cosmic Designer, what this Designer is like, and what he expects. The universe also reveals that it must have been caused to exist by Another and that its regularity and preservation in existence is attributable to Another. There is a God who created, regulates, and sustains the world. And this world is dependent on God, not God on the world.

God does not reveal himself in any other way but through creation. The universe is the deist's Bible. Only it reveals God. All other alleged revelations, whether verbal or written, are human inventions (*see* REVELATION, SPECIAL).

Miracles. Miracles do not occur (*see* MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST). God either cannot intervene in nature, or he will not. Those deists who believe God cannot perform miracles often argue from the immutability of the laws of nature. A miracle would violate natural laws. But natural laws are immutable, hence cannot be violated, for a violation would involve a change in the unchangeable. Therefore, miracles are impossible. Those deists who think God could perform a miracle but would not, often argue from the proneness of humans toward superstition and deception, the lack of sufficient evidence in support of a miracle, and the unbroken human experience of nature as uniform. They insist that it magnifies the nature of the perfect Mechanic that he made the machine of nature to run without constant need of repair. For deists all miracle accounts are the result of human invention or superstition.

Human Beings. Deists agree that humanity has been created by God and is adequately suited to live happily in the world. The human being is personal, rational, and free (*see* FREE WILL), endowed with natural rights that should not be violated by any individual, group, or government. The human being has the rational ability to discover in nature all that needs to be known to live a happy and full life.

Like all other animals, *Homo sapiens* was created with strengths and weaknesses. Strengths are reason and freedom. Among weaknesses is a tendency toward superstition and a desire to dominate others of his race. Both of these innate weaknesses have led to supernatural religions and oppressive governments.

Ethics. The basis of human morality is grounded in nature (*see* LAW, NATURE AND KINDS OF ; REVELATION, GENERAL). In nature each person discovers how to be self-governing, to associate with other creatures, and to relate to God. For many deists the only innate human

principle is the desire for happiness. How this innate desire is satisfied is governed according to reason. A person who fails to act by reason becomes miserable and acts immorally.

Deists differ on the universality of moral laws. They agree that the basis of all value is universal, because it is grounded in nature. But they disagree as to which moral laws are absolute and which are relative. The fact that there is a right and a wrong is not in dispute. The problem is in determining exactly what is right and wrong in each case and circumstance. Some deists, such as Jefferson, conclude that specific moral rules are relative. What is considered right in one culture is wrong in another (*see* MORALITY, ABSOLUTE NATURE OF). Other deists would argue that a correct use of reason will always lead one to an absolute right and an absolute wrong, though the application of these absolutes may vary with culture and circumstance.

Human Destiny. Though some deists deny that humanity survives death in any respect, many believe that people live on. For most of these deists, the afterlife is of an immaterial nature where the morally good people will be rewarded by God and the morally bad ones will be punished.

History. In general, deists had little to say about history. They commonly held that history was linear and purposeful. They also held that God did not intervene in history through supernatural acts of revelation or signs called miracles. They differed on whether God concerned himself with what occurs in history. Many French deists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries believed God was utterly unconcerned. Most English deists looked to God to exercise a certain degree of providential care over the affairs of history, yet without miraculous intervention.

Many deists held that the study of history had great value. For, if nothing else, history demonstrates the human tendency toward superstition, deception, and domination, and the terrible consequences which follow when this tendency goes unchecked and unchallenged.

An Evaluation of Deism. Contributions. Positive things may be learned from deism. Many have agreed with the deists' insistence on the importance and use of reason in religious matters (*see* APOLOGETICS, NEED FOR ; FAITH AND REASON ; LOGIC). The many claims made about miracles and supernatural revelation must be verified. No reasonable person would step into an elevator if he had good reason to believe that it was unsafe. Neither should anyone trust a religious claim without good reason to believe that it is true.

Deists have been commended for their belief that the world reflects the existence of a God (*see* COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT). The regularity and orderliness of the world suggests a cosmic Designer. The inadequacy of the world to account for its operations and existence seems to imply an ultimate explanation beyond the world—God. The limited perfections discoverable in nature may imply that there is an unlimited perfect Being beyond nature who created and sustains all things. This natural evidence is available for all to view and respond to in a reasonable way.

Deists have also been credited with exposing much religious deception and superstition. Their relentless attacks on many beliefs and practices have helped people to evaluate their religious faith and to purge it of corruption.

Criticisms of Deism. Yet there is reason to criticize the deistic worldview. A being who could bring the universe into existence from nothing could certainly perform lesser miracles if he chose to do so. A God who created water could part it or make it possible for a person to walk on it. The immediate multiplication of loaves of bread and fish would be no problem to a God who created matter and life in the first place. A virgin birth or even a physical resurrection from the dead would be minor miracles in comparison to the miracle of creating the universe from nothing. It seems self-defeating to admit a great miracle like creation and then to deny the possibility of lesser miracles.

The deists' understanding of universal natural law is no longer valid. Scientists today consider the laws of nature to be general, not necessarily universal. Natural laws describe how nature generally behaves. They do not dictate how nature must always behave (*see* MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST).

If God created the universe for the good of his creatures, it seems that he would miraculously intervene in their lives if their good depended on it. Surely their all-good Creator would not abandon his creation. Instead it would seem that such a God would continue to exercise the love and concern for his creatures that prompted him to create them to begin with, even if it meant providing that care through miraculous means (*see* EVIL, PROBLEM OF).

Assuming, then, that miracles are possible, then one cannot reject out of hand every claim to supernatural revelation without first examining the evidence for its support. If it lacks supporting evidence, it should be rejected. But if the evidence does substantiate the claim, then the alleged revelation should be considered authentic. It certainly should not simply be ruled out of court without further investigation.

Further, simply because many individuals and groups have invented and abused religious beliefs is not sufficient ground for rejecting supernatural religions. Scientific discoveries have been abused, but few suggest that abuse makes the discoveries false or a reason to abolish science. Also, the mutability of human language and the fact of human error does not appear to be a valid argument against supernatural revelation (*see* BIBLE, ALLEGED ERRORS IN ; BIBLE, EVIDENCE FOR). An all-powerful, all-knowing God could conceivably overcome these problems. At least such problems should not rule out the possibility that God has revealed himself, either verbally or in written form. Again, the evidence should first be consulted.

Finally, the deists' case against Christianity and the Bible has been found wanting (*see* BIBLE CRITICISM). What antisupernaturalist has adequately answered such Christian theists as J. Gersham Machen, and C. S. Lewis (*see* Lewis, esp. *Miracles* ; Machen)? They have built an extensive and solid case from science, philosophy, and logic against the belief that miracle stories in the Bible are necessarily mythical (*see* MYTHOLOGY AND THE NEW TESTAMENT).

For example, Paine's belief that most of the books of the Bible were written by people other than the ones who claimed to write them and written very late is still proclaimed as indisputable fact by many critics. But there is not one credible shred of evidence that has not been rejected for good reason by archaeologists and biblical scholars. More than 25,000 finds have confirmed the picture of the ancient world given in the Bible (*see* ARCHAEOLOGY, NEW TESTAMENT ;

ARCHAEOLOGY, OLD TESTAMENT). There is sufficient evidence to support the authorship claims and early dates for most biblical books (*see* NEW TESTAMENT, DATING OF ; NEW TESTAMENT DOCUMENTS, RELIABILITY OF).

Further, the deistic attack against such Christian teachings as the Trinity, redemption, and deity of Christ (*see* CHRIST, DEITY OF), shows a superficial and naive understanding of these teachings.

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Derrida, Jacques. Jacques Derrida is usually regarded as a contemporary French “philosopher,” though some challenge that he is truly a philosopher. He is the father of a movement known as “deconstructionism.” He personally disavows the term’s popular meaning. The movement also is called “postmodern,” though Derrida again does not use the term in describing his view.

Among Derrida’s influential books are *Speech and Phenomena* (1967–68, trans. 1973), *Of Grammatology* (trans. 1978), *Writing and Differance* (trans. 1978), *Positions* (1981), and *Limited Inc.* (1977, trans. 1988).

Pieces of his thinking are drawn from Immanuel Kant (metaphysics), Friedrich Nietzsche (atheism), Ludwig Wittgenstein (view of language), Friedrich Frege (conventionalism), Edmund

Husserl (phenomenological method; *see* TRUTH, ABSOLUTE NATURE OF), Martin Heidegger (existentialism), and William James (pragmatism and the will to believe).

Derrida's views are difficult to understand because of the nature of the positions, his writing, and sometimes poor translations. Because of such factors, he has been often misread. He does not embrace nihilism, for example, which is the negation of all being and value (*see* MORALITY, ABSOLUTE NATURE OF). Nor is he an anarchist who negates all social structure. Despite writings which seem to negate all moral law, neither is Derrida an antinomian.

Deconstructionism is a form of hermeneutics, of interpreting a text. As such it can be distinguished from other interpretive approaches. Yet Derrida is not interested in destroying meaning, but of reconstructing it. It is not negation that dismantles a text, but criticism that remodels it. It stands against fixed rules of analysis. A deconstructionist reads and rereads a text, looking for new, deeper, forgotten meanings.

Deconstructionism embraces *conventionalism* . All meaning is relative to a culture and situation. There is no meaning prior to language.

Deconstructionism accepts *perspectivalism* . All truth is conditioned by one's perspective.

Deconstructionism holds a form of *referentialism* . There is no perfect reference or one-to-one correspondence between words and the meaning they confer. Meaning, therefore, is ultimately untransferrable between writer and reader. We constantly change the context through which we view symbols. This context is limited. We cannot know from an infinite perspective.

Deconstructionism is *differentialism* . All rational structures leave something out. The reader approaches the text with suspicion, looking for the "difference," the unknown something that is not there.

Deconstructionism embraces a form of linguistic *solipsism*. By this view we cannot escape the limits of language. We can broaden our linguistic concepts, but we cannot escape their limits.

Deconstruction holds to *semantic progressivism* . One will never exhaust all possible meanings. A text can always be deconstructed.

Derrida and Deconstructionism. Derrida is an atheist (*see* ATHEISM) regarding the existence of God and agnostic concerning the possibility of knowing absolute truth. He is antimetaphysical, claiming that no metaphysics is possible. He believes we are locked in our own linguistic bubble. Yet he recognizes that using language to deny metaphysics is itself a form of metaphysics. This incoherence points to the need for archi-writing, a poetic protest against metaphysics.

Three factors are key to understanding Derrida's philosophy—grammar, logic, and rhetoric. Grammar expresses acceptable phrases with appropriate modifying words. Logic recognizes the absurdity of contradictory phrases. And rhetoric shows how and when to use the phrases mastered through grammar and logic.

Derrida believes that grammar is relatively superficial, having to do with keeping the signs of language in good order. Logic and rhetoric are more profound, dealing with the use and interpretation of signs. Derrida rejects the history of Western philosophy in which language is based on logic. That would mean there is a logical underpinning of reality. He rejects that assumption.

According to Derrida, language is based on rhetoric, not logic. The sovereignty of logic is rooted in the view that signs (e.g., words) represent ideas. Ideas stand in semantical contrast to other ideas. Language differentiates ideas. We must "deconstruct" language based in logic to learn how linguistic expressions are used in human activity. Language based on logic entails a mistaken belief that there are "private languages" with "inner speech" and "private mental life." If logic is sovereign, then a private language is possible. Ideas would not vary with circumstances.

Rhetoric as Basis of Language. Derrida held that meaning is based in rhetorical force, viz., the role it plays in human activity (*see* WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG). Rather than an underlying formal logic, meaning comes out of the stream of life. Words express time-bound experience. So to understand what a text means one must first fully understand its actual life context. This may be seen in five central arguments of Derrida:

1. All Meaning is Complex. No pure and simple meanings stand behind the signs of language. If all language is complex, no essential meaning transcends time and place.
2. All Meaning is Contingent. Every object of language and meaning is contingent upon a changing life reality. There is no objective meaning.
3. All Meaning is Mixed. No pure experiences exist without reference to transient experience. There is no private mental life that does not presuppose an actual world. We cannot even think about a concept without contaminating it with some reference to our own past or future.
4. There is no such thing as a perception. Deconstructionists do not reject everyday experience. They reject idealized concepts disconnected from the everyday world. The nature of what is signified is not independent of the sign that signifies it.
5. Rhetoric is the basis of all meaning. All written language is dependent on spoken language. It is not dependent on the meaning of spoken signs. It is dependent on the pattern of vocalization (phonemics). Phonemes are parts of sound that can be represented by a letter. Without this difference in phonemes letters are impossible. "Differance" is the key to meaning, since all sounds must be differentiated to be distinct and form meaningful sounds.

With Derrida, many believe Western philosophy comes to an end. It literally self-destructs as it deconstructs. Derrida himself believes it goes on endlessly in continuous deconstructions or reinterpretations.

Evaluation. Derrida shows how the linguistic tradition leads to agnosticism. He makes some pointed critiques of Western thought. He reveals that, unless one's philosophy begins in reality, it will never logically end in reality. His critique of "private language," esoteric thought cut off from human experience is insightful.

Nonetheless, Derrida's deconstructionism is open to serious critique.

His difficult (highly metaphorical) expression is obscure and contradictory. This obscures his view, generates misunderstanding, and makes evaluation difficult. His view contains self-defeating claims, such as: "The history of philosophy is closed." Or, "Metaphysics has come to an end." He cannot avoid using philosophy and metaphysics in such statements. His doubt that we can really know anything is self-defeating. How does he know this unless we can know something? What sort of epistemological status should we give to his statements? If they were true, they would be false. If they are mere poetical protests, then they do not destroy objective meaning or metaphysics.

Even his denial of logic in rhetoric is highly problematic, if not self-defeating. The very language that denies logic is based in it; otherwise it would be meaningless.

Despite his rejection of (or protest against) metaphysics, Derrida has metaphysical presuppositions. The very fact he discusses "What is real?" indicates an underlying metaphysics. Also, he claims language depends on a relation to the world. That implies a metaphysical view of the world.

His view is a form of nominalism and radical empiricism ("Real" is concrete reality, immediately before me). As such it reduces to a type of solipsism and is subject to the same criticism of these views.

The primacy of difference over identity departs from common sense and makes all real communication impossible. Indeed, Derrida could not even communicate his own position to us if he is right.

Derrida's position is closely associated with logical positivism with its well-known self-defeating nature. (For a critique, see AYER, A. J.) Derrida's conventionalist view of meaning is self-defeating (see CONVENTIONALISM). The sentences conveying his view would have no meaning on a conventionalist theory of meaning. In short, he appears to have left himself no ground to stand on—even to express his own view.

Finally, Derrida's "speech" is no better than Kant's unknowable "noumena," Wittgenstein's "silence," or Hume's "flames." For none of them tell us anything about reality.

A faith of sorts is involved in this process, and deconstructionism is fideist (see FIDEISM). Faith is always necessary. Since absolute meaning is impossible, indecision is inescapable. We always live somewhere between absolute certainty and absolute doubt, between skepticism and dogmatism. Hence, faith is always necessary.

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Descartes, Rene.

Life and Works of Descartes. French theist Rene Descartes was born in 1596 and died in 1650 after giving an early-morning philosophy lesson to Queen Christina of Sweden. He was called to philosophy through a dream on November 10, 1619. He was a great mathematician and learned philosophy from the Jesuits. His main works are *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641) and *Discourse on Method* (1637).

His Philosophical Method. Descartes sought an Archimedean point at which he could begin thinking. Unlike St. Augustine (see), who went through a period of actual doubt, Descartes was never a skeptic. He used doubt as a universal and methodical starting point for his philosophy.

Method Stated. Descartes' method was simple and universal. He proposed to withhold doubt only from what is indubitable. In brief, doubt everything it is consistently possible to doubt.

Method Applied. Applying his method, Descartes found that he could doubt: (1) his senses—since they sometimes deceive (e.g., a stick in water seems crooked); (2) that he was awake—since he might be dreaming he was awake; (3) that $2 + 3 = 5$ —since his memory may fail to remember the numbers; (4) that there is an external world—since an evil demon may be deceiving him. However, in all his doubt there was one thing Descartes found it impossible to doubt, namely, that he was doubting.

From Doubt to Existence. Descartes had found his universal starting point in doubt. He argued from doubt to thought to existence. He went from *dubito* to *cogito* to *sum* (from "I doubt" to "I think" to "I am").

Descartes reasoned thus: The one thing that I cannot doubt is that I am doubting. But if I am doubting, then I am thinking (for doubt is a form of thought). And if I am thinking, then I am a thinking thing (for only minds can think).

At this point Descartes posited that there is a difference between a thinking thing and an extended thing. My mind is a thinking thing—and I cannot doubt its existence. My body and the world are extended things—and I can doubt their existence. Hence, even though he was a theist, he could find no way to reason directly to God from the external world, such as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Gottfried Leibniz, and many other theists have (see COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT).

God's Existence Can Be Proven. Nevertheless, Descartes found an indirect way to demonstrate God's existence involving the external world. He would begin with his indubitable starting point in his own existence and reason from it to God and then from God to the external world.

A Cosmological Argument (A Posteriori Proof). Descartes' reasoning proceeded as follows. (1) If I doubt, then I am imperfect (for I lack in knowledge). (2) But if I know I am imperfect, then I must know the perfect (otherwise I would have no way of knowing that I am not perfect). (3) Now knowledge of the perfect cannot arise from me, since I am imperfect (an imperfect mind cannot be the source [basis] of a perfect idea). (4) Hence, there must be a perfect Mind that is the source of this perfect idea. This approach was distinctive, if not unique. Descartes had to prove God existed before he could be sure the world existed!

The Ontological Argument (A Priori Proof). Like St. Anselm before him, Descartes believed the ontological argument for God's existence was valid. His form of it went like this: (1) It is logically necessary to affirm of a concept what is essential to its nature (e.g., a triangle must have three sides). (2) But existence is logically necessary to the nature of a necessary Existent (i.e., Being). (3) Therefore, it is logically necessary to affirm that a necessary Existent does exist.

There were many reactions to Descartes' ontological argument. But he staunchly defended it, restating it in this form to avoid some criticism: (1) God's existence cannot be conceived as only possible but not actual (for then he would not be a necessary Existent); (2) we can conceive of God's existence (it is not contradictory); (3) therefore, God's existence must be conceived as more than possible (namely, as actual).

One objection to his argument that he never answered was that of Pierre Gassendi's insistence that Descartes did not really prove God's existence is not logically impossible. Hence, he did not prove it is logically necessary. Gottfried Leibniz later argued that existence is a perfection and as such is a simple and irreducible quality that cannot conflict with others. Hence, God can have all perfections, including existence. But Immanuel Kant later critiques this view, insisting that existence is not an attribute.

Descartes' Test for Truth. Descartes was a rationalist, followed by Benedict Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz. As such, he believed that truth was found in the realm of ideas.

Clear and Distinct Ideas. For Descartes the true idea was a clear and distinct idea. Only clear and distinct ideas are true (not mixed ones), namely, those ideas known by rational intuition as self-evident. Or, those which are (geometrically) deducible from self-evident ideas.

Four Rules of Valid Thinking. In his *Discourse on Method* Descartes set forth four rules for determining a true idea. First, the rule of certainty states that only indubitably certain (clear and distinct) ideas should be accepted as true. Second, the rule of division affirms that all problems should be reduced to their simplest parts. Third, according to the rule of order, reasoning should proceed from simple to complex. Finally, the rule of enumeration says that one should review and recheck each step in the argument.

The Source of Errors. Every epistemology must account for error, especially one like Descartes' that exalts certainty. Descartes' answer was that errors arise in judgment (the will), not in thought. For when we judge to be so what we do not clearly know to be so we fall into error.

The Proof of the Existence of an External World via God. Descartes' very method of systematic doubt brought the question of the existence of an external world in question—at least by way of the senses alone. Hence, it was necessary for him to argue for the world's existence in a more circuitous manner. This he did in the following way: (1) I am receiving a strong and steady succession of ideas of a world that are not under my control (hence, I cannot be erring about them); (2) hence, either God is making me believe them falsely or else there is a real external world causing them; (3) but God will not deceive me (nor allow me to be deceived) in what I am perceiving clearly and distinctly, since he is perfect (and deception is a sign of imperfection); (4) therefore, it is true that there is an external world; (5) since the same argument applies to my body, it is true that I have a body.

An Evaluation of Descartes' Views. Descartes is a mixed blessing to Christian theism. On the one hand, he is a rationalist who offers arguments for God's existence. On the other hand, his form of rationalistic dualism is a significant negative factor supporting views that are contrary to biblical theism.

Some Positive Features. On the good side of the ledger, Descartes can be commended for several things. Among them several have apologetic value.

Truth is objective. For one thing, Descartes held that truth is objective (see TRUTH, NATURE OF). It is not subjective or mystical. Rather, truth is common to all rational minds.

Truth is knowable. In opposition to agnosticism, Descartes affirmed that truth is knowable. Unlike Immanuel Kant or David Hume, Descartes argued that the truth about reality is knowable by the mind. Further, he held that certitude could be gained in our knowledge. Skepticism was avoidable. Indeed, it is self-refuting.

Truth is rational. Descartes embraced first principles of knowledge, such as the law of non-contradiction. He used them in understanding the world. He believed that without them reality could not be known.

Truth is arguable. Not only is truth knowable and rational, but one can offer rational arguments, such as arguments for the existence of God. This view is helpful for Christian apologetics, particularly for classical apologetics.

Negative Dimensions. Not everything Descartes believed is helpful for the Christian apologist. In fact, some things have proven to be a bane to orthodox Christianity.

The invalid ontological argument. Most Christian apologists do not agree with Descartes' defense of the ontological argument. Most thinkers argue that it involves an illegitimate transition from thought to reality.

His insufficient starting point. A more serious problem is Descartes' starting point. Why should one doubt what is obvious to him, namely, that he has a body and that there are other bodies around him? Why should one doubt everything that is doubtable? Why not doubt only what is necessary to doubt or what one has no good reason to believe? Or to put it another way, one can doubt whether Descartes' starting point in doubt is the best way to approach the world.

Unrealistic starting point. Descartes began his philosophy in thought (indubitable thought) and then moved to reality. He reasoned "I think, therefore, I am." In reality, however, "I am, therefore, I think." He literally got de carte before de horse!

Once one begins in the realm of thought apart from reality, he or she can never legitimately break out of the realm of pure thought. Just is the fate of any rationalism or idealism that does not begin within existence (see REALISM).

Unbridgeable dualism of mind and body. Descartes' particular form of rationalism set up an unbridgeable dualism between mind and matter. In fact, they are defined in such a way that they are logically separate. Mind is defined as a thinking but nonextended thing, and matter as a nonthinking extended thing. Thus, by definition "never the twain shall meet." In doing this Descartes opened himself to the criticism of holding that man is "a ghost in a machine." This Cartesian dualism has serious implications for one's view of the nature of human beings as well as the nature of Scripture. For it not only denies the unity of human nature, but sets up a dichotomy in nature between the material and spiritual that supports much of negative biblical criticism (see BIBLE CRITICISM ; BIBLE, EVIDENCE FOR ; BIBLE, ALLEGED ERRORS IN).

Other problems. Descartes has been criticized for many other things—space does not permit elaborating. Like Benedict Spinoza , he had a questionable geometric form of deductionism. He does not justify his use of the principle of causality. Nor does Descartes prove that an imperfect mind cannot be the cause of a perfect idea. He lacks appreciation for the role of experience in the pursuit of truth. His criterion of truth is not clear. It cannot apply to concepts, since only judgments are true. And it cannot apply to judgments, since he admits some of them are false. Finally, his view reduces to mental solipsism (namely, I know only while I am thinking—right now—and not when I am not thinking).

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Determinism. Determinism is the belief that all events, including human choices (see FREE WILL), are determined or caused by another. Proponents of this view believe that human choices are the result of antecedent causes, which in turn were caused by prior causes.

Kinds of Determinism. There are two basic kinds of determinism: naturalistic and theistic. Naturalistic determinists include behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner, author of *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* and *Beyond Behaviorism* . An atheist (see ATHEISM), Skinner wrote that all human behavior is determined by genetic and behavioral factors. On this view, humans are like a brush in the hands of an artist, though in his view the "artist" is a mix of societal manipulation and chance. The human being is at the mercy of these forces, simply the instrument through which they are expressed.

The theistic version of this view insists that God is the ultimate cause who determines all human actions. Martin Luther 's *Bondage of the Will* and Jonathan Edwards ' *Freedom of the Will* are examples of this theistic determinism. It is the view held by all strong Calvinists.

Arguments for Determinism. *The Argument from Alternative Possibility.* All human behavior is either uncaused, self-caused, or caused by something else. However, human behavior cannot be uncaused, since nothing occurs without a cause. Further, human actions cannot be self-caused, for no act can cause itself. To do so, it would have to be prior to itself, which is impossible. The only remaining alternative, then, is that all human behavior is caused by something external to it.

The Argument from the Nature of Causality. Edwards argued from the nature of causality. He reasoned that since the principle of causality (see CAUSALITY, PRINCIPLE OF ; FIRST PRINCIPLES) demands that all actions are caused, then it is irrational to claim that things arise without a cause. But for Edwards a self-caused action is impossible, since a cause is prior to an effect, and one cannot be prior to himself. Therefore, all actions are ultimately caused by a First Cause (God). "Free choice" for Edwards is doing what one desires, but God gives the desires or affections that control action. Hence, all human actions ultimately are determined by God.

The Argument from Sovereignty. If God is sovereign, then all acts must be determined by him (see GOD, NATURE OF). For if God is in control of all, then he must ultimately be the cause of all. Otherwise, he would not be in complete control.

The Argument from Omniscience. Some determinists argue from God's omniscience. For if God knows everything, then everything he knows must occur according to his will. If it did not,

then God would be wrong in what he knew. But an omniscient Mind cannot be wrong in what it knows.

A Response to Theistic Determinism. Nondeterminists, especially self-determinists (*see* FREE WILL), reject the premises of determinist arguments. It is important to distinguish two forms of determinism, hard and soft. The determinism rejected here is hard determinism:

Hard Determinism	Soft Determinism
Act is caused by God.	Act is not caused by God.
God is the only cause.	God is the primary cause; humans are the secondary cause.
Totally free human choice is eliminated.	Human free choice is compatible with sovereignty.

Soft determinism is sometimes called *compatibilism* , since it is “compatible” with free choice (self-determinism). Only hard determinism is incompatible with free choice or secondary causality of a human free agent.

Response to the Argument from Alternative Possibility. All human behavior is either uncaused, self-caused, or caused by something else. But human behavior can be self-caused, since there is nothing contradictory about a self-caused action (as there is about a self-caused being). For an action does not have to be prior to itself to be caused by oneself. Only the self (I) must be prior to the action. A self-caused action is simply one caused by my self. And my self (I) is prior to my actions.

Response to the Argument from the Nature of Causality. Jonathan Edwards rightly argued that all actions are caused, but it does not follow from this that God is the cause of all these actions. A self-caused action is not impossible, since one’s self is prior to his actions. Therefore, all actions need not be attributed to the First Cause (God). Some actions can be caused by human beings to whom God gave free moral agency. Free choice is not, as Edwards contends, doing what one desires (with God giving the desires). Rather, it is doing what one decides. And one does not always do what he desires, as is the case when duty is placed above desire. Hence, it does not follow that all actions are determined by God.

Response to the Argument from Sovereignty. One need not reject God’s sovereign control of the universe in order to believe determinism is wrong. For God can control by his omniscience, as well as by his causal power. As the next point reveals, God can control events by willing in accordance with his omniscient knowledge of what will occur by free choice. God need not make (or cause) the choice himself. Simply knowing for sure that a person will freely do something is enough for God to control the world.

Response to the Argument from Omniscience. It is true that everything God knows must occur according to his will. If it did not, then God would be wrong in what he knew. For an omniscient Mind cannot be wrong in what it knows. However, it does not follow from this that all events are determined (i.e., caused by God). God could simply determine that we be self-determining beings in a moral sense. The fact that he knows for certain what free creatures will

do with their freedom is enough to make the event determined. But the fact that God does not force them to choose, is enough to establish that human free acts are not determined (caused) by another but by oneself. God determined the *fact* of human freedom, but free creatures perform the *acts* of human freedom.

Weaknesses of Determinism. Determinism is self-defeating. A determinist insists that both determinists and nondeterminists are determined to believe what they believe. However, determinists believe self-determinists are wrong and ought to change their view. But “ought to change” implies they are free to change, which is contrary to determinism.

Determinism is irrational . C. S. Lewis argued that naturalistic, complete determinism is irrational (see Lewis). For determinism to be true, there would have to be a rational basis for their thought. But if determinism is true, then there is no rational basis for thought, since all is determined by nonrational forces. So, if determinism claims to be true, then it must be false.

Determinism destroys human responsibility. If God is the cause of all human actions, then human beings are not morally responsible. One is only responsible for a choice if there was free will to avoid making it. All responsibility implies the ability to respond, either on one’s own or by God’s grace. Ought implies can. But if God caused the action, then we could not have avoided it. Hence, we are not responsible.

Determinism renders praise and blame meaningless. Similarly, if God causes all human actions, then it makes no sense to praise human beings for doing good, nor to blame them for doing evil. For if the courageous really had no choice other than to show courage, why reward it? If the evil had no choice but to commit their crime, why punish them? Rewards and punishment for moral behavior makes sense only if the actions were not caused by another.

Determinism leads to fatalism. If everything is determined beyond our control, then why do good and avoid evil? Indeed, if determinism is right, evil is unavoidable. Determinism destroys the very motive to do good and shun evil.

Determinism is unbiblical. Theistic opponents to determinism offer several objections from Scripture. Defining free choice as “doing what one desires” is contrary to experience. For people do not always do what they desire, nor do they always desire to do what they do (cf. Rom. 7:15–16).

If God must give the desire before one can perform an act, then God must have given Lucifer the desire to rebel against him. But this is impossible, for in that case God would be giving a desire against God. God would in effect be against himself, which is impossible.

Theistic determinists like Edwards have a faulty, mechanistic view of human personhood. He likens human free choice to balancing scales in need of more pressure from the outside in order to tip the scales from dead center. But humans are not machines; they are persons made in the image of God (Gen. 1:27).

Edwards wrongly assumes that self-determinism is contrary to God's sovereignty. For God could have predetermined things in accordance with free choice, rather than in contradiction to it. Even the Calvinistic *Westminster Confession of Faith* declares that "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet by the same providence he ordereth them to fall out, *according to* the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (5.2 emphasis added).

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Dewey, John. John Dewey (1859–1952) has been called the father of modern American education, on which he has had immense influence. As a philosopher and writer he is closely identified with the philosophy of instrumentalism, also known as progressivism or pragmatic humanism. Through the American educational system, his views have influenced virtually every American of the twentieth century. Dewey signed the *Humanist Manifesto* and was a leader in the movement to turn education toward secular humanism (*see* HUMANISM, SECULAR).

Born and educated in Vermont, Dewey took his doctorate at Johns Hopkins University. There he studied the pragmatism of C. S. Pierce, the experimental psychology of G. S. Hall, and the philosophies of G. S. Morris (a neo-Hegelian), and T. H. Huxley. Dewey taught at the universities of Michigan and Chicago and was at Columbia University from 1904 to 1930. Dewey wrote many books and numerous articles on topics ranging from education and democracy (*Democracy and Education* , 1916), to psychology (*Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology* , 1930), logic (*Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* , 1938), and even art (*Art as Experience* , 1934). His view of God and religion is best expressed in *A Common Faith* (1934).

Religion in an Age of Science. As a secular humanist, Dewey rejected belief in a theistic God (*see* THEISM). Dewey concluded that modern science made belief in a supernatural origin of the universe untenable. "The impact of astronomy eliminated the older religious creation

stories." And "geological discoveries have displaced creation myths which once bulked large." In addition, "biology has revolutionized conceptions of soul and mind, . . . and this science has made a profound impression upon ideas of sin, redemption, and immortality." Further, "anthropology, history and literary criticism have furnished a radically different version of the historic events and personages upon which Christian religions have built." Psychology "is already opening to us natural explanations of phenomena so extraordinary that once their supernatural origin was, so to say, the natural explanation" (*A Common Faith* , 31).

Science, Dewey believed, had made even agnosticism too mild of a reaction to traditional theism. " 'Agnosticism' is a shadow cast by the eclipse of the supernatural" (*ibid.*, 86). And "generalized agnosticism is only a halfway elimination of the supernatural." As an antitheist or atheist (*see* ATHEISM), he rejected any attempt to support the existence of God. "The cause of the dissatisfaction is perhaps not so much (1) the arguments that Kant used to show the insufficiency of these alleged proofs, as it is the growing feeling (2) that they are too formal to offer any support to religion in action" (*ibid.*, 11). He believed the reality of evil could not be reconciled with the concept of a personal, good, and all-powerful God (*see* EVIL, PROBLEM OF).

From its infancy in the Renaissance through the eighteenth century's protest against ecclesiastical authority, Dewey believed secularism had borne fruit in the nineteenth-century "diffusion of the supernatural through secular life" (*ibid.*, 65). Secular interests had grown independent of organized religion and had "crowded the social importance of organized religions into a corner and the area of this corner is decreasing" (*ibid.*, 83).

Since there is no Creator, human beings were not created. For Dewey modern men and women think in scientific and secular terms, thus, they must now take a naturalistic view of origins (*see* EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL). Humanity is a result of naturalistic evolutionary processes, not the special creation by any kind of God.

The Elimination of Supernatural Religion. Dewey adamantly opposed any supernaturalism in religion. Since most religions pay some homage to the supernatural, he opposed religion in concept: "The claim on the part of religions to possess a monopoly of ideas and of the supernatural means by which alone, it is alleged, they can be furthered, stands in the way of the realization of distinctively religious values inherent in natural experience" (*ibid.*, 27–28). Science calls into question the very concept of the supernatural. Many things once thought to be miraculous are now known to have natural explanations. Science will continue to explain the unusual phenomena of nature (*see* MIRACLES, ARGUMENTS AGAINST).

Not only is belief in the supernatural based on ignorance, but it hinders social intelligence. "It stifles the growth of the social intelligence by means of which the direction of social change could be taken out of the region of accident, as accident is defined" (*ibid.*, 78).

Religions "involve specific intellectual beliefs, and they attach . . . importance to assent to these doctrines as true, true in an intellectual sense." That is, "they have developed a doctrinal apparatus it is incumbent upon 'believers' . . . to accept" (*ibid.*, 29). Those beliefs include notions of unseen powers that control human destiny and to which obedience, reverence, and worship are due. Nothing is left in such beliefs that is worth preserving (*ibid.*, 7).

Such beliefs hinder social progress. For “Men have never fully used the powers they possess to advance the good in life, because they have waited upon some power external to themselves and to nature to do the work they are responsible for doing. Dependence upon an external power is the counterpart of surrender of human endeavor” (ibid., 46).

The problem is religion’s sacred-secular split. “The conception that ‘religious’ signifies a certain attitude and outlook, independent of the supernatural, necessitates no such division.” For “It does not shut religious values up within a particular compartment, nor assume that a particular form of association bears a unique relation to it. Upon the social side the future of the religious function seems preeminently bound up with its emancipation from religions and a particular religion” (ibid., 66, 67).

Not only is social progress hindered by belief in the supernatural, but social values are deprecated by it. “The contention of an increasing number of persons is that depreciation of natural social values has resulted, both in principle and in actual fact, from reference of their origin and significance to supernatural sources” (ibid., 71).

Even truly religious attitudes are hampered by belief in the supernatural. Dewey wrote, “I have suggested that the religious element in life has been hampered by conceptions of the supernatural that were imbedded in those cultures wherein man had little control over outer nature and little in the way of sure method of inquiry and test” (ibid., 56).

A New Sort of Religion. Despite Dewey’s rejection of religion and the supernatural, he by no means considered himself irreligious. He insisted on the need for, and preservation of, the religious. What Dewey did insist on was that religion as traditionally defined—as involving belief in the supernatural beyond this life—be discarded as a religious attitude toward all of life: “I shall develop another conception of the nature of the religious phase of experience, one that separates it from the supernatural and the things that have grown up about it.” And “I shall try to show that these derivations are encumbrances and that what is genuinely religious will undergo an emancipation when it is relieved from them; that then, for the first time, the religious aspect of experience will be free to develop freely on its own account” (ibid., 2).

The most serious problem with religion is that it hinders social progress. Its belief in the supernatural hinders achievement of socially desirable goals. Therefore, nothing is lost by eliminating it. In fact, since more people are religious than have a religion, there is much to be gained by rejecting religion. For, said Dewey, “I believe that many persons are so repelled from what exists as a religion by its intellectual and moral implications, that they are not even aware of attitudes in themselves that if they came to fruition would be genuinely religious” (ibid., 9).

The Establishment of Natural Religious Attitudes. Dewey was quick to point out that he was not proposing that a new natural religion replace supernatural religion. Rather, he sought to emancipate elements and outlooks that might be called religious (ibid., 8). The difference between a religion and the religious is that a religion “always signifies a special body of beliefs and practices having some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight.” By contrast, “the adjective ‘religious’ denotes nothing in the way of a specifiable entity, either institutional or as a

system of beliefs.” Rather, “it denotes an attitude that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal” (ibid., 9, 10).

Replacing traditional religion with religious attitudes would readjust and reorient life. Thus Dewey’s humanistic definition of the religious is “any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring value is religious in quality” (ibid., 27).

Dewey acknowledges with Friedrich Schleiermacher that a religious experience involves a feeling of dependence. But he insists it must be a dependence without traditional doctrines or fear (ibid., 25). Religious experience helps to develop a sense of unity impossible without it. For by a religious experience “the self is always directed toward something beyond itself and so its own unification depends upon the idea of the integration of the shifting scenes of the world into that imaginative totality we call the Universe” (ibid., 19).

Such experience takes place in different ways in different people. “It is sometimes brought about by devotion to a cause; sometimes by a passage of poetry that opens a new perspective; sometimes as was the case with Spinoza . . . through philosophical reflection.” So religious experiences are not necessarily unique species of their own. Rather, “they occur frequently in connection with many significant moments of living” (ibid., 14). Religious experience is a kind of unifying ideal of other experiences in life.

Dewey was willing to use the term *God*, but it meant, not a supernatural being, but “the ideal ends that at a given time and place one acknowledges as having authority over his volition and emotion, the values to which one is supremely devoted, as far as these ends, through imagination, take on unity” (ibid., 42) God represents a unification of one’s essential values. For Dewey, progress and achievement were such ideal values.

He thought it essential that persons have such religious ideals. For “Neither observation, thought, nor practical activity can attain that complete unification of the self which is called a whole. The *whole* self is an ideal, an imaginative projection” (ibid., 19). Thus, self-unification can be achieved only through a religious commitment to “God” (that is, to ideal-values). Says Dewey, “I should describe this faith as the unification of the self through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination presents to us and to which the human will responds as worthy of controlling our desires and choices” (ibid., 33).

A Common Faith. Dewey’s religious form of pragmatic humanism was global. In his “common faith” he saw a religious goal for all. “Here are all the elements for a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant” (ibid., 87). He saw the doctrine of the brotherhood as having the greatest religious significance. “Whether or not we are, save in some metaphorical sense, all brothers, we are at least in the same boat traversing the same turbulent ocean. The potential religious significance of this fact is infinite” (ibid., 84).

Dewey’s Ultimate. For Dewey the absolute was democratic progress. Dewey opposed traditional supernatural religion because he perceived that it hindered social progress. He said

“the assumption that only supernatural agencies can give control is a sure method of retarding this effort [of social betterment]” (ibid., 76).

He saw three stages in social development. “In the first stage, human relationships were thought to be so infected with the evils of corrupt human nature as to require redemption from external and supernatural sources.” This must be rejected. “In the next stage, what is significant in these relations is found to be akin to values esteemed distinctively religious.” This too must be surpassed. “The third stage would realize that in fact the values prized in those religions that have ideal elements are idealizations of things characteristic of natural association which have been projected into a supernatural realm for safe-keeping and sanction. . . . Unless there is a movement into what I have called the third stage, fundamental dualism and a division in life continue” (ibid., 73).

Science as the Means to Progress. Naturally, it is up to humankind to achieve social progress. This belief is neither egoistic nor optimistic. The only adequate means of achieving the goal of social progress is science. “There is but one sure road of access to truth—the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experimental record and controlled reflection” (ibid., 32). For “were we to admit that there is but one method for ascertaining fact and truth that conveyed by the word ‘scientific’ in its most general and generous sense—no discovery in any branch of knowledge and inquiry could then disturb the faith that is religious” (ibid., 33).

For Dewey faith in science, that is, in the critical intelligence, is more religious than faith in any revelation from God. On the other hand, “Some fixed doctrinal apparatus is necessary for a religion. But faith in the possibilities of continued and rigorous inquiry does not limit access to truth to any channel or scheme of things.” This faith reveres intelligence as a force (ibid., 26).

Science has a decided advantage over religion as a means for human progress because it is a method, not a set of fixed beliefs. It is a way to change thinking by tested inquiry. Not only is science superior to religion, but it opposes religious dogma. “For scientific method is adverse not only to dogma but to doctrine as well, provided we take ‘doctrine’ in its usual meaning—a body of definite beliefs that need only to be taught and learned as true.” However, “This negative attitude of science to doctrine does not indicate indifference to truth. It signifies supreme loyalty to the method by which truth is attained. The scientific-religious conflict ultimately is a conflict between allegiance to this method and allegiance to even an irreducible minimum of belief so fixed in advance that it can never be modified” (ibid., 38, 39).

Hence, science and religion are irreconcilable. But a religious dedication to science is essential to human progress.

Evaluation. Pragmatism. Dewey’s relativism is manifest in truth and ethics. By the pragmatic view of truth, whatever works is true. But many things that “work” in the short-run are false. Truth is not what works, but what corresponds with the facts (*see* TRUTH, NATURE OF). No pragmatist would appreciate someone misrepresenting his view simply because it worked well to do so. Even pragmatist parents do not want their children to lie to them simply because it is expedient to do so from the child’s perspective. Josiah Royce criticized James’s pragmatism

by asking whether James would take the witness stand in court and “swear to tell the expedient, the whole expedient and nothing but the expedient, so help him future experience!”

Pragmatism fares no better in the realm of ethics. Not everything that works is right. Some things that work very well are simply evil. Cheating, deceiving, and even killing undesirables have been “successful” activities. Ethical questions are not settled by obtaining desired results. All that success proves is that a given course of action *works* ; it does not prove the course of action is *right* .

Progressivism. Dewey’s relativism is not total. His system has the absolute of progress or achievement. Whatever works for social progress is good; what hinders it is evil. But by what standard is progress to be judged? If the standard is within society, then we cannot be sure we are *progressing* . Maybe we are only *changing* . If the standard is outside the race, this is a transcendent norm, a divine imperative, which Dewey rejects.

Another problem with progressivism is its lack of a fixed point by which one measures change. Otherwise, one could not even measure the change. If, for example, an observer of a moving car who is in a moving car cannot easily know how fast the other car is moving. If the other car is moving at the same speed in the same direction, the observer cannot even know it is moving unless something else that isn’t moving can be used to measure it.

In practice progressivism is grounded in the wishes of those with the power to set the agenda. Why *social* progressivism? Why *democratic* social progressivism? One can progress toward ever-better dictatorships. Dewey’s definition of “achievement” or “progress” in social and democratic terms was utterly arbitrary and philosophically unjustified. It stands on no better ground than other goals one may choose.

Relativism. Closely allied to progressivism is relativism. Dewey denies absolutes in the realm of truth (*see* TRUTH, NATURE OF) or ethics (*see* MORALITY, ABSOLUTE NATURE OF). This is inconsistent. To show that *all* is relative, one must have a nonrelative vantage point from which to view all of truth. One cannot relativize all else unless he stands on absolute ground. The statement “All is relative” either means that statement also is relative, or else that at least that statement is absolute. We have seen that Dewey believed in absolutes, but of his own choosing. Thus, his statement is self-defeating and fails according to Dewey’s own worldview. He is guilty of special pleading, saying that everything is relative, except what he wants to be absolute. This is pure dogmatism.

Summary. Dewey’s humanism was naturalistic, relativistic, optimistic, and even religious, despite its opposition to religion. Some characteristics of this thought are peculiar to Dewey. Dewey’s form of humanism was pragmatic, militantly secular, progressive, and democratic. Also, Dewey placed great emphasis on science as the means for human achievement. His definition of *God* as the ideal, unifying goal for human progress is his own. Dewey believed in salvation by education, and the heart of education is experimentation. We learn by doing, and learning is forever incomplete. There is always room for more progress. There will not be a millennium, only a continual and relative process of seeking new goals by means of pragmatic experimentation.

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Divine Birth Stories. Since James Frazer published *The Golden Bough* (1890, 1912), it has been common to charge that Christianity is not unique in its story of Christ's incarnation, but that stories of supernatural births are common to pagan gods. If true, this would appear to undermine Christianity by showing that it might have borrowed ideas from other religions.

Several lines of evidence that refute the pagan myth source theory are discussed in detail elsewhere (*see* LUKE, ALLEGED ERRORS IN ; MITHRAISM ; MYTHOLOGY AND THE NEW TESTAMENT ; NEW TESTAMENT, HISTORICITY OF ; VIRGIN BIRTH). Here the main points are summarized:

1. The New Testament was written by contemporaries and is not the result of late myth development. Legends do not develop if the stories are written while eyewitnesses are still alive to refute inaccuracies.
2. The virgin birth records do not show signs of being mythical, nor do they include borrowed elements from known pagan birth myths.
3. Persons, places, and events identified in connection with Christ's birth are accurate historically. Even details once thought to be errors have been vindicated by research.
4. No Greek myth spoke of the literal incarnation of a monotheistic God into human form. In Christianity the second person of the Godhead became human. In pagan religions gods were only disguised as humans; they were not really human. In pagan myths a god and human invariably mated sexually, which was not true in the Christian account.
5. Greek myths of gods who became human postdate the time of Christ, so the Gospel writers could not have borrowed from them.

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Divine-Human Legends. See APOTHEOSIS .

Docetism. Docetism (Gk. *dokein* , "to seem") was a late-first-century heresy asserting that Jesus only seemed to be human (Kelly, 141). Docetism is "The assertion that Christ's human body was a phantasm, and that his suffering and death were mere appearances. 'If he suffered he was not God; if he was God he did not suffer' " (Bettenson, 49). They denied the humanity of Christ but affirmed his deity. This is the opposite of Arianism, which affirmed the humanity of Jesus but denied the deity of Christ (*see* CHRIST, DEITY OF). Docetism was already present in late New Testament times, as is evident by the exhortation of John the apostle about those who deny "that Jesus Christ has come *in the flesh* " (1 John 4:2 ; emphasis added. See also 2 John 7).

A Biblical Response. The Scriptures are replete with evidence that Jesus Christ was fully human in every respect, yet without sin (Heb. 4:15). Indeed, he is called "the man, Christ Jesus" (1 Tim. 2:5).

Jesus Had a Human Ancestry. The Gospels affirm that Jesus had an actual human genealogy all the way back to the first man, Adam. This was only possible on his mother's side, since he was born of a virgin (Matt. 1:20–25 ; Luke 2:1–7 ; *see* VIRGIN BIRTH). Matthew traces Jesus' genealogy to Abraham through his legal father, Joseph, through whom he inherited the right to the throne of David (Matt. 1:1). Luke apparently traces Jesus' genealogy through Mary, his actual mother, back to Adam, the actual head of the human race (Luke 3:23–38).

Jesus Had a Human Conception. According to Matthew, "an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream and said, "Joseph son of David, do not be afraid to take Mary home as your wife, because what is conceived in her is from the Holy Spirit" (Matt. 1:20). In scientific language, Jesus started the way all human beings do, by the fertilization of a human ovum. Only in his case it was supernaturally fertilized by the Holy Spirit, not by a human sperm.

Jesus Had a Human Birth. According to Dr. Luke,

Joseph also went up from the town of Nazareth in Galilee to Judea, to Bethlehem the town of David, because he belonged to the house and line of David. He went there to register with Mary, who was pledged to be married to him and was expecting a child. While they were there, the time came for the baby to be born, and she gave birth to her firstborn, a son. She wrapped him in cloths and placed him in a manger, because there was no room for them in the inn. [Luke 2:4–7]

There was nothing unnatural, or even supernatural, about Jesus' birth. Mary had a nine-month pregnancy (Luke 1:26 , 56 , 57), birth pains, and Jesus was born through the birth canal as other natural children are born. Luke, citing Mosaic law, spoke of Jesus as "a male who opens the

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womb” (Luke 2:23 KJV), the same phrase used of all Jewish male firstborn. It was a natural birth, only in Mary’s case she had no birth maid so she gave birth by herself (Luke 2:7).

Paul states Jesus’ human birth more simply: “But when the time had fully come, God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under law” (Gal. 4:4). He was “born of woman,” as are the rest of us (1 Cor. 11:12).

Jesus Had a Human Childhood. Although little is known of Jesus’ childhood, enough is known to conclude that he grew up as did other children, learned, and developed normally. Like other Jewish boys he was circumcised when eight days old and dedicated to the Lord in the temple when he was forty days old (Luke 2:21–22). Apparently he was a precocious child (Luke 2:41–49), impressing the religious leaders with his knowledge of spiritual matters at age 12 (Luke 2:42–47). From that time, Luke reports, “Jesus grew in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and men” (Luke 2:52). As a man, he was finite in understanding. As God, he was infinite in all things (*see* TRINITY).

Jesus Experienced Human Hunger. Luke records that Jesus went into the wilderness “where for forty days he was tempted by the devil. He ate nothing during those days, and at the end of them he was hungry” (4:2). Jesus’ body needed food to sustain it.

Jesus Experienced Human Thirst. John says that “Jesus, tired as he was from the journey, sat down by the well. It was about the sixth hour. When a Samaritan woman came to draw water, Jesus said to her, ‘Will you give me a drink?’ ” (4:6–7). Jesus needed water to sustain his body. When he did not have enough, he felt thirsty.

Jesus Experienced Human Fatigue. Jesus also got tired physically. And when he got tired, he rested. John said Jesus was “wearied with [his] journey” (John 4:6). At other times he withdrew from the crowd, “because so many people were coming and going that they did not even have a chance to eat, he said to them, ‘Come with me by yourselves to a quiet place and get some rest’ ” (Mark 6:31).

Jesus Had Human Emotions. The shortest verse in the Bible says simply, “Jesus wept” (John 11:35) when he stood by his friend’s grave. But a moment earlier, the text says, “when Jesus saw her weeping, and the Jews who had come along with her also weeping, he was deeply moved in spirit and troubled” (vs. 33). Jesus wept over Jerusalem, crying out, “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, but you were not willing” (Matt. 23:37).

Jesus also experienced anger when he saw the temple being desecrated, “so he made a whip out of cords, and drove all from the temple area, both sheep and cattle; he scattered the coins of the money changers and overturned their tables” (John 2:15). Angered by religious hypocrisy he lashed out at the religious leaders,

“Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You travel over land and sea to win a single convert, and when he becomes one, you make him twice as much a son of hell as you are.

“Woe to you, blind guides! You say, ‘If anyone swears by the temple, it means nothing; but if anyone swears by the gold of the temple, he is bound by his oath’ ” (Matt. 23:15–16).

Jesus Had a Human Sense of Humor. Contrary to some austere opinions, Jesus possessed a sense of humor. Humor is based in the sense of the incongruous. Jesus expressed this on several occasions. In the same Matthew 23 denunciation he said to the Scribes and Pharisees: “You blind guides! You strain out a gnat but swallow a camel!” (vs. 24). Even after his resurrection he chided his experienced fisherman disciples that they had fished all night without catching one fish (John 21:5).

Jesus Had Human Language and Culture. Jesus was Jewish. He was the Son of Abraham and of David (Matt. 1:1). He had a Jewish mother (Matt. 1:20–25 ; Gal. 4:4). He had a Jewish culture and religion (John 4:5–9 , 21–22). The woman of Samaria immediately recognized him as a Jew by the way he looked and talked (John 4:9).

Jesus Experienced Human Temptation. The writer of Hebrews informs us that “we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but we have one who has been tempted in every way, just as we are—yet was without sin” (4:15). The temptation of Christ was real (Matthew 3). As a human being, Christ felt its full force (Matt. 26:38–42).

Jesus Was Human Flesh and Blood. Jesus, like Adam before the fall, did not possess inherent mortality. That came as a result of the fall (Rom. 5:12). Nevertheless, Jesus was capable of dying and did die. Like any other human, Jesus bled when cut. “One of the soldiers pierced Jesus’ side with a spear, bringing a sudden flow of blood and water” (John 19:34). Hebrews shared the implications of that flesh and blood: “Since the children have flesh and blood, he too shared in their humanity so that by his death he might destroy him who holds the power of death—that is, the devil” (2:14).

Jesus Suffered Human Pain. Crucifixion inflicts an agonizing death, and Jesus experienced every moment of it, refusing even a drug to deaden the pain (Matt. 27:34). His pain was both physical and emotional. While on the cross he cried out in agony, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Matt. 27:46). Before his death, he agonized in the garden, sweating as it were great drops of blood and confessing, “My soul is overwhelmed with sorrow to the point of death” (Matt. 26:38). The writer of Hebrews describes Jesus’ experience vividly: “During the days of Jesus’ life on earth, he offered up prayers and petitions with loud cries and tears to the one who could save him from death, and he was heard because of his reverent submission” (5:7).

Jesus Experienced Human Death. The Bible repeatedly testifies that Jesus died (for example, Matt. 16:21 ; Rom. 5:8 ; 1 Cor. 15:3 ; *see* CHRIST, DEATH OF). He was “put to death in the body” (1 Peter 3:18). Scriptures say repeatedly that Jesus shed his “blood” for our sins. Paul wrote,

“But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far away have been brought near through the blood of Christ” (Eph. 2:13). Hebrews adds, “How much more, then, will the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself unblemished to God, cleanse our consciences from acts that lead to death, so that we may serve the living God!” (9:14).

A Theological Response. The denial of Christ’s humanity is as serious an error as to deny his deity. If Jesus is not both God and human, he cannot mediate between God and humans (1 Tim. 2:5). Salvation involves reconciliation of human beings to God (2 Cor. 5:18–19). This is only possible if God becomes human. Anselm made this point in his *Cur Deus Homo?* (*Why the God Man?*) To deny Christ’s true humanity is to deny the basis of our reconciliation to God. It is for this reason that the early church condemned docetism. Among those charged with teaching this false doctrine was Cerinthus, whom the apostle John opposed at Ephesus (see Cross, 413; Douglas, 305).

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Dooyeweerd, Herman. Herman Dooyeweerd (1894–1977) was a Dutch Reformed philosopher who attended, and later taught legal philosophy at the Free University in Amsterdam (1926–65). He is best known for his four-volume work, *A New Critique of Theoretical Thought* (1953–58). He founded the journal *Philosophia Reformata*, which was instrumental in the establishing of the Association for Calvinistic Philosophy (later called Christian Philosophy). Other works included *The Christian Idea of the State*, *In the Twilight of Western Thought*, *Roots of Western Culture*, and *Transcendental Problems*. His work followed in the Reformed tradition of Abraham Kuyper (1837–1920), although he went well beyond his predecessor in the critique of Western thought and in the development of his own system.

The Philosophy of Dooyeweerd. Although his thought springs from the Reformed thinker Kuyper, the philosophical roots of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy go deeply into both Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). He begins with a critique of the foundations of Western thought, concluding that its basis in reason is ill-founded and unfruitful. It is blind to its own religious commitments, especially the pretended autonomy by which philosophy severed itself from divine revelation. Likewise, he rejected the adequacy of general revelation or common grace as a grounds for building a natural theology (see GOD, EVIDENCE FOR).

The Transcendental Critique. One of Dooyeweerd’s legacies is his *transcendental critique*, which was used by Cornelius Van Til in his presuppositional apologetics. The form of argument

follows Kant’s transcendental reduction, whereby one posits the necessary conditions of thought and actions.

The transcendental critique differs from transcendent criticism. The latter is purely external, not getting at the internal root of the issue. The transcendental critique “What is it that makes science possible?” “How does Faith (the religious starting point) direct science (and philosophy)?” “How can it, unfortunately, also misdirect science?” (Klapwijk, 22). According to Jacob Klapwijk, this critique “zeroes in on the phenomena of science itself, retracing from the inside out, as it were, the train of thought which science follows, so as to finally arrive at its point of origin; the hidden religious starting point of all scientific activity” (ibid.).

The transcendental critique seeks out “antithesis,” since its task is to conflict with all human-based thought structures. A law of human knowledge is that the truth is gained only in the conflict of opinion (Dooyeweerd, ix). This internal criticism opposes the absolute starting point of an unregenerate heart and “tries to open a thinker’s eyes to pretheoretical presuppositions and motivations” that, according to Dooyeweerd, are religious in nature (ibid.). By it one shows “that reasoned argumentation of the human understanding is propelled (and possibly warped) by the motivation of the human heart” (ibid.). For every scientist, consciously or unconsciously, has a “cosmological idea” or general framework into which is fit all factual knowledge. “This framework itself, however, is erected on a (believing or unbelieving) religious foundation” (ibid.). So the transcendental method is the key to the door of the heart. Only in service of God can it be used to unlock that door.

The Heart as the Root of Reality. Dooyeweerd regarded the heart as the root of Christian existence. It is the religious center of one’s being. The fallen heart is set against God; hence, there is no religiously neutral thought structure to which one can appeal in building a philosophical system (see NOETIC EFFECTS OF SIN).

The fallacy of all non-Christian thought is that it attempts to find meaning in creation. But meaning is not found in the immanent creation but in the transcendent Creator. Hence, we must reject human autonomy (see SCHAEFFER, FRANCIS) and live in dependence on God’s revelation (see Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*, 67).

Sphere Sovereignty. Dooyeweerd builds a distinctively Christian system of hierarchically ordered spheres which he claims comprise the foundation of reality. His theory is known as sphere sovereignty, with each sphere of intellectual or practical activity subordinate to God’s revelation.

God has set up fifteen spheres for the operation of different aspects of creation:

Succession of Sphere	Modal Moment	Science
1. numerical	discrete quantity	mathematics
2. spatial	extension	mathematics
3. kinematic	movement	mechanics

4. physical	energy	physics, chemistry
5. biological	organic life	biology, physiology, and morphology
6. psychical	feeling- sensation	empirical psychology
7. analytical	theoretical distinction	logic
8. historical	cultural process	history of the development of human society
9. linguistic	symbolic signification	philology, semantics
10. social	social intercourse	sociology
11. economic	economy	economics
12. aesthetic	harmony	aesthetics
13. juridical	retribution	jurisprudence
14. ethical	love of one's neighbor	ethics
15. pistical-faith	transcendent certainty regarding the origin	theology

(Adapted from: E. L. Hebdon Taylor: *The Christian Philosophy of Law, Politics, and the State* [Nutley, N.J.: Craig, 1969], 274.)

All meaning in created spheres points beyond itself. Dooyeweerd wrote: “*Meaning*, as we said, constantly points *without* and *beyond* itself toward an origin, which is itself no longer *meaning*. It remains within the bounds of the *relative*. *The true Origin*, on the contrary, is absolute and *self-sufficient!*” (*New Critique*, 10). Further, there are no isolated truths. All truth must be understood in coherence with the whole system of truth. “There exists no partial truth which is sufficient to itself. Partial *theoretical* truth is truth only in the coherence of the theoretical truths, and this coherence in its relativity pre-supposes the fullness or the totality of truth” (*ibid.*, 116).

Only God, the Sovereign, is absolute. Each sphere is relative and subordinate to him. “The concept of an ‘absolute theoretical truth’ dissolves itself in inner contradiction” (*ibid.*, 156). “This means that the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought must lead its adherents into a seemingly inescapable *impasse*. To maintain this autonomy, they are obligated to seek their starting point in theoretical thought itself” (Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight*, 19).

Each sphere is subject to the sovereignty of God. Dooyeweerd quotes Calvin: “God is not subject to the laws [He made], but [He is] not arbitrary” (*A New Critique*, 93). This judgment is at the foundation of all speculative thought. It lays “bare the limits of human reason set for it by God in His temporal world-order” (*ibid.*).

Influence. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy has not had wide acceptance outside Reformed circles, but has nevertheless attracted a small band of dedicated followers. Hans Rookmaaker and Van Til are perhaps his most noted disciples, although Francis Schaeffer popularized many of his ideas.

Evaluation. Positive Contributions. Among the valuable aspects of Dooyeweerd’s thought is his desire to preserve the sovereignty of God.

A massive critique of non-Christian thought. Few Christian philosophers have aimed more directly at the jugular of non-Christian thought. Dooyeweerd offers a massive critique of the foundations of Western thought, correctly assessing that it is blind to its own religious commitments.

Sovereignty and sphere sovereignty. Dooyeweerd keeps things in proper order. God is first, and he is sovereign. Nothing else is absolutely absolute. All else is dependent on him. With God’s absolute sovereignty firmly in place, Dooyeweerd sees all other spheres as derivative. Indeed, the very idea that everything under God is only sovereign *in its sphere* is helpful. For when there are conflicts between spheres, it keeps in focus that they are not absolutely absolute.

The heart. Dooyeweerd’s philosophy begins in the heart. For, as the Scriptures says, “Above all else, guard your heart, for it is the wellspring of life” (Prov. 4:23). Indeed, atheism begins in the heart (Ps. 14:1). So, no complete understanding of humanity is possible without including the role of the heart.

The firm starting point. As a firm starting point for his philosophy the post-Kantian Dooyeweerd developed a transcendental argument, which became characteristic of his disciple, Van Til. This approach offers firm epistemological grounds on which to build.

Negative Aspects. Dooyeweerd has critics, even among Reformed theologians. Likewise, he rejected the adequacy of general revelation (*see* REVELATION, GENERAL) or common grace as a grounds for building a natural theology (*see* GOD, EVIDENCE FOR).

The tendency toward voluntarism. Inherent in Dooyeweerd’s stress on sovereignty is an implied voluntarism. While he makes a noble attempt to avoid the charge of being arbitrary, he does not seem to succeed. For unchangeable rules of reason common to God and man, but rooted in God’s nature, do not seem to be what he has in mind (*see* GOD, NATURE OF).

A confusion of the autonomy and ultimacy of reason. While Dooyeweerd is right in chastising the autonomy of reason apart from God, he does not seem to appreciate that this does not mean that reason can be an ultimate standard for truth. This springs out of his voluntarism, which sees reason as springing from God’s will, not as anchored in his very nature.

The lack of biblical support. There is a general failure to demonstrate that all his spheres are rooted in Scripture. From a distinctly Christian perspective, which his view claims to be, this is a serious shortcoming.

A basic inconsistency. Dooyeweerd insists that an autonomous human being cannot self-interpret creation. He must view it with the help of God from God’s point of view. Yet, he claims that there is a prescientific (phenomenological) starting point at which the person can interpret creation. In this regard, Dooyeweerd is not consistent with a transcendental approach. For rather

than looking for the transcendently necessary conditions of all human thought and actions, he seems to root his epistemology in a phenomenological starting point.

A nonrational starting point. Further, this phenomenological method is self-defeating. One cannot *conceive* of the preconceptual nor *think* the prerational. The truth is that reason is inescapable. There is no prerational starting point for rational beings.

A denial of the ultimacy of the laws of logic. For Dooyeweerd, logic as we know it applies only to the created world. But how then can we think about God without these laws of thought? Certainly, truth cannot be found in contradictory statements about God. How would this differ from a Zen Buddhist's *koan* (*see* BUDDHISM), such as one hand clapping, being a key to "understanding" ultimate reality (the Tao)?

Inadequate tests for truth. Dooyeweerd's tests for truth seem to reduce to a subjective one (the witness of the Holy Spirit) and an inadequate one (internal consistency). The latter is really only a test for falsity; all inconsistent views are false. But it is not really a test for truth, since more than one opposing view may be internally inconsistent (*see* CLARK, GORDON).

The insufficiency of general revelation. Like many other Reformed thinkers, Dooyeweerd believes that general revelation is not understandable by fallen humanity. However, this is directly contrary to the claim of the Scriptures (Rom. 1:19–20 ; 2:12) which affirm that general revelation is "clearly perceived" and fallen humanity stands condemned for not responding to it (*see* REVELATION, GENERAL). The fact that the unbelieving heart does not *receive* it (1 Cor 2:14) in no way means that they do not *perceive* God's general revelation (cf. Ps. 19:1–6 ; Acts 14:17).

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Double-Truth Theory. See AVERROES .

Doubt. See CERTAINTY/CERTITUDE ; FAITH AND REASON ; FIRST PRINCIPLES ; INDUCTIVISM ; HOLY SPIRIT, ROLE IN APOLOGETICS .

Dualism. In metaphysics dualism is the belief that there are two coeternal principles in conflict with each other, such as matter and form (or spirit) or of good and evil. Platonism is an example of the former and Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, and Manichaeism are examples of the latter. Dualists believe in creation *ex materia*, that is, out of preexisting matter or stuff. This is in contrast to theists, who believe in creation *ex nihilo*, out of nothing, and with pantheists (*see* PANTHEISM), who believe in creation *ex Deo*, out of God (*see* CREATION, VIEWS OF).

Difficulties with Dualism. As Thomas Aquinas observed (*see* Aquinas, *passim*), not all first principles, such as good and evil, are eternal. Short and tall are opposites, but it does not follow that there must be eternally short and eternally tall beings. Thus, good and evil can be opposed to each other without both being eternal. He reasoned that the problem is the assumption that "because all contraries seem to be compressed under the headings of good and evil, in that one of them by comparison is always deficient, they reckon that the primary active principles are the Good and the Evil." So "there is not one first principle of evil as there is of good." One reason for this is that "the original principle of things is essentially good. [But] nothing can be essentially bad. Every being, as being, is good; evil does not exist except in a good subject" (Aquinas 1.1).

In dualism neither principle can be supreme, since each is limited by the other. But, it would seem that something must be ultimate. As C. S. Lewis observed, "the two Powers, the good and the evil, do not explain each other. Neither . . . can claim to be the Ultimate. More ultimate than either of them is the inextricable fact of their being there together. Each of them, therefore, is *conditioned*— finds himself willy nilly in a situation; and either that situation itself, or some unknown force which produced that situation, is the real Ultimate" (Lewis, *God in the Dock*, 22). "You cannot accept two conditioned and mutually independent beings as self-grounded, self-comprehending Absolute" (*ibid.*).

In the moral sense, one principle cannot be pronounced "good" and the other "evil," unless they are measured by something outside either of them. But, as Lewis noted, "the moment you say that, you are putting into the universe a third thing in addition to the two Powers: some law or standard or rule of good which one of the powers conforms to and the other fails to conform to." However, since "the two powers are judged by this standard, or the Being who made this standard, then this standard, or the Being who made this standard, is farther back and higher up than either of them, and He will be the real God" (*Mere Christianity*, 49).

"Dualism gives evil a positive, substantive, self-consistent nature, like that of good." But "If evil has the same kind of reality as good, the same autonomy and completeness, our allegiance to good becomes the arbitrary chosen loyalty of a partisan." But "a sound theory of value . . . demands that good should be original and evil a mere perversion; that good should be the tree and evil the ivy; that good should be able to see all round evil (as when sane men understand lunacy) while evil cannot retaliate in kind . . ." (Lewis, *God in the Dock*, 22–23).

As Augustine concluded, evil is the lack of good and not the reverse. For when we take all the evil out of something it is better. But when we take all the good from something there is nothing (Augustine). Hence, good is the ultimate and evil is a limitation in or privation of evil (*see* EVIL, PROBLEM OF).

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